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The Drug Innovation Paradox
Erika Lietzan*

ABSTRACT
In medicine today, we face an innovation paradox. The companies that
develop new medicines are highly dependent on a period of exclusive marketing after approval, to fund their research and development programs. But
longer research and development programs are not associated with longer periods of exclusive marketing. Instead, the period of exclusive marketing may
be shorter. Exclusivity that dwindles with each additional month of pre-commercialization research would ordinarily lead innovators to be more efficient,
but the drug regulatory system leads to a different result. In this system, the
length of any particular premarket program turns largely on considerations
not within the firm’s control. The design and length of the program are a function of variables that include the molecule and its chemical class, its mechanism of action, the disease and disease stage targeted, the outcomes that can
be formally tested, the nature of other treatments on the market, and scientific
obstacles and opportunities at the time. Certain types of medicine – for example, drugs for long-term use and prevention of disease, drugs to stop progressive or degenerative diseases, and drugs for early stage cancer – are more
likely to require longer research and development programs. These findings
have significant implications for innovation policy. There is a paradox in drug
innovation: we have chosen to incentivize research and development with a
post-market reward, but as the research and development timeline increases,
the post-market reward for that innovation remains the same or decreases. If
the length of the premarket process correlates with particular drug types, disease targets, or studied outcomes, we may be offering an inadequate incentive
in entire areas of medicine where we desperately need new treatments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In medicine today, we face an innovation paradox. Companies that develop new medicines depend on a period of exclusive marketing after approval,
to fund their research and development programs. This period is made possible
by patent protection and regulatory data exclusivity. But when a particular
premarket research and development program is more challenging and timeconsuming than other programs, the period for exclusive marketing is not
longer and may, in fact, be shorter. This is a paradox; the relationship between
the incentive (exclusive marketing) and the behavior we seek to encourage with
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the incentive (research and innovation) is the opposite of what one would expect. The scheme contradicts itself.1 This Article explores the drug innovation
paradox, using scientific and historical regulatory sources and a new dataset
constructed from publicly available sources. Its findings have profound implications for innovation policy. The length of the premarket period may correlate
with particular drug types, disease targets, and studied outcomes, which means
we may not be providing adequate incentive to develop new medicines in entire
areas of need.
Federal patent law stimulates scientific and technological progress – innovation – by ensuring that innovators can enjoy a period of exclusivity in their
inventions, meaning a period during which no others may manufacture and sell
embodiments of their inventions.2 Federal drug law prohibits the sale of new
medicines, however, until those medicines have been approved by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).3 The tension between these two
frameworks – one protecting exclusivity in an invention, the other precluding
commercialization of that invention – gives rise to the paradox that is the topic
of this Article.
Obtaining approval of a new drug generally entails testing the medicine
in a laboratory and in animals (“preclinical” testing) and then completing several rounds of trials in humans (“clinical” trials), followed by preparation and
submission of a marketing application. This process can take years and can
cost in the high hundreds of millions of dollars (or more), and its outcome is
uncertain.4 After a new medicine reaches the market, it may face competition
from other medicines for the same condition, but it generally enjoys a period
of exclusive marketing before FDA will approve generic copies. Generic copies are usually priced at a fraction of the price of a new medicine (often known
as the “brand” product) and are usually substituted by pharmacists for the brand

1. See Paradox, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2016) (providing second definition of “paradox” as “a person,
thing, or situation that exhibits inexplicable or contradictory aspects”).
2. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinning of Patent Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 247, 247, 253 (1994) (explaining how the patent system “relies on property concepts” and “prevents others from reaping where they have not sown and thereby
promotes research and development (R & D) investment in innovation”).
3. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(a) (West 2018).
4. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 26 (2016) (estimating average outof-pocket cost per approved compound of $1.4 billion and total preapproval cost of
$2.56 billion); Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK. L.
REV. 91, 107–08 (2016) (discussing range of estimates for the length of time and cost
of developing a new drug).
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product at the point of sale.5 Their approval ends the brand product’s exclusivity in the marketplace, and in fact, they usually take the lion’s share of the
market.6
There is a paradoxical relationship between the period for exclusive marketing and the premarket research and development performed for FDA approval. If a particular premarket research and development program is more
challenging and time-consuming than other programs, the period for exclusive
marketing is not longer and may, in fact, be shorter. The exclusive marketing
period prior to generic market entry is largely a function of the company’s patents. Certain aspects of patent law doctrine effectively require the application
for a patent claiming the active ingredient of a new drug to be filed early in the
research and development process. Patents last for a fixed term, which used to
start when the patent issued but now starts on the date of the patent application.
Either way, much of the patent term can elapse while the company is performing the research needed for approval.7 And the more research performed, the
more of the patent term elapses. The period for exclusive marketing of a medicine is also a function of the “data exclusivity” available to the innovator.
During this time, generic companies may not rely on the research generated
and submitted by the innovator for approval of their own drugs.8 Data exclusivity suffers from a slightly different problem; even where the premarket study
period is much longer, the length of the data exclusivity period does not change.
5. Substitution is typically required or at least encouraged by state law. New
York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 644–45 (2d Cir. 2015) (describing state substitution laws). It may also be required by insurers. Id. at 646.
6. Henry Grabowski et al., Recent Trends in Brand-Name and Generic Drug
Competition, 17 J. MED. ECON. 1, 6 (2013) (finding that the average new molecular
entity experiencing initial generic entry in 2011 and 2012 retained only sixteen percent
of market share after one year).
7. The design of our patent system – making early patent filings not only possible
but preferable – has its proponents as well as its critics. In the late 1970s, for instance,
Professor Kitch argued that early patenting allows a patentee to coordinate later investment and development of embryonic technology. Edmund Kitch, The Nature & Function of the Patent System, 20 J. LAW & ECON. 265 (1977). More recently, Professor
Duffy has argued that the race to win an early patent effects an efficient adjustment in
the patent life, in part because a race to patent is also a race to patent expiry. John
Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004).
These rosy views of early patenting are tempered by the views of others. Professor
Abramowicz, for example, notes that early patenting leads to less time on the market
with the patent in force, which in turn can lead to underdeveloped technologies. Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 1065 (2007). He sees this as a particular risk for embryonic inventions, where the
post-patent cost of development and time to market are substantial, citing pharmaceuticals as an example. Id. at 1095–96. In the case of pharmaceuticals, as this Article
explains, the commercialization delay that results from post-invention research is a legal condition of market entry.
8. See Lietzan, supra note 4, at 105–07, 110–20 (explaining reliance-based applications).
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The problem of patent life that runs before new medicines may be
launched is not new. It has been an issue since the middle part of the twentieth
century, when the premarket paradigm at FDA began to evolve into today’s
preapproval regime. In 1984, therefore, Congress took steps to address the
problem. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the drug approval law included
a new section 156 of the Patent Act, allowing the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”) to restore some of the lost time to one patent selected by the
drug applicant.9 This provision was directed to the general problem that some
patent life elapses during premarket testing. It was not directed specifically to
the paradox that longer research programs result in shorter effective patent life.
And it did not remove the paradox. Under section 156, a patent owner recovers
none of the time spent in preclinical testing and only half of the time spent in
clinical trials. Also, it cannot recover more than five years, no matter how long
premarket research took. As a result, the drug approval scheme still works at
cross purposes with the patent scheme. Where the premarket study period is
longer, the “effective life” of the patent – the term remaining after approval of
the medicine – is shorter.
This paradox is not unique to medicines. In any field of technology, research activities prior to commercialization lead to a decline in effective patent
life, and the longer the research period the shorter the effective patent life. This
should generally drive inventors to efficient pre-commercialization behavior.
The concern with medicines, however, stems from the basic theory of our drug
approval system, on the one hand, and the scientific and regulatory realities of
clinical trial design, on the other hand.
There are two components to drug approval theory. First, FDA’s authority derives from and revolves around the words used to describe a new drug.
When it approves a new drug, it approves the new drug plus its labeling. More
precisely, it approves a specific combination of active ingredient (or, in some
cases, more than one active ingredient), product features (such as formulation,
route of administration, dosage form, and strength), and labeling that describes
the product’s intended uses, its conditions of safe and effective use, and the
outcomes that can be expected. Second, the company developing the product
and submitting the application – the drug’s “sponsor” – must perform hypothesis-testing trials designed to prove that its product achieves this outcome under the conditions of use specified. The labeling will be precise. The disease
state might not be hypertension but instead severe hypertension when rapid
emergency reduction is clinically indicated. The outcome might be specific:
improved memory in patients with mild Alzheimer’s disease, for instance, or
delayed progression in patients with breast cancer. The company’s trials must
have established precisely what is said in the labeling.
Put another way, a new drug approved by FDA is both the tangible item
administered to patients and the words that describe what the item is and does.
A premarket research and development program is thus tailored to generate
9. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98–417, § 201, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
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specific information about a drug, disease, and outcome. The theory of our
drug approval system is that a new drug approved by FDA – itself both the
tangible item and the words describing its uses – is the product of a research
design and the data generated.
The scientific and regulatory realities of clinical trial design complete the
picture. The premarket research process is highly idiosyncratic, and many aspects relevant to the length of a research program turn on considerations beyond a sponsor’s control. The design and length of studies reflect not only the
statutory and regulatory framework applied by FDA but also the chemical
structure of the molecule, its mechanism of action, the disease and disease stage
under study, the outcomes that the firm can study, current scientific capabilities
and impediments, and sometimes even the nature of other products on the market. Moreover, although premarket programs are highly individual, certain
types of products almost always take longer to develop than others. For instance, as both a scientific matter and a statistical matter, how one proves an
antihistamine reduces itching in the eye is very different from how one proves
a cytotoxic (cell-killing) compound prolongs survival in patients with earlystage colon cancer. The latter will probably require longer trials.
This means that if the post-approval reward gets shorter when research
takes longer, certain types of research – and therefore certain types of drugs –
will be affected more than others. Because the prospect of post-approval reward stimulates the innovation and investment in the first place, development
of these drugs may therefore be under-incentivized.
It may not be possible to measure the impact of the innovation paradox
on public health. Companies rarely describe the compounds that they decline
to pursue or abandon in the earliest stages, and we have no way to know
whether those compounds would have satisfied the FDA approval standard for
any particular clinical use. Still, signs of trouble may be emerging. One recent
study found that firms are under-investing in the development of cancer drugs
that require long-term trials.10 Several research-based pharmaceutical companies abruptly terminated their neuroscience research programs in the late
2000s, citing the higher failure rate and the longer development time than for
other medicines.11 The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Tech-

10. Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence
from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2047 (2015) (examining clinical trials for cancer conducted between 1973 and 2011 and finding a negative correlation between investment in research and development, measured by the number of trials
in a national cancer registry compiled by the National Cancer Institute and a drug’s
“commercialization lag,” or time to market, for which they used longer survival time
as a proxy).
11. Alison Abbott, Novartis to Shut Brain Research Facility, 480 NATURE 161,
161–62 (2011) (noting withdrawals of Novartis, GlaxoSmithKline, and AstraZeneca);
David Nutt & Guy Goodwin, ECNP Summit on the Future of CNS Drug Research in
Europe 2011, 21 EUR. NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 495, 496 (2011) (listing factors
cited by the companies in a closed summit of companies, government officials, patient
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nology reported in 2012 that venture capital to fund drug development activities appears to be declining at least in part due to “unfavorable returns in the
drug-innovation sector,” and it expressed concern that companies “are exiting
important fields of critical public health need.”12
This Article contributes to the literature on incentives for pharmaceutical
innovation by explaining and exploring the innovation paradox. First, it explains the theory of new drug approval and uses historical scientific and regulatory materials to illustrate that the premarket paradigm at any given time depends heavily on the state of clinical trial methodology, statistical methodology, and clinical pharmacology, as well as the prevailing regulatory climate.
The length of any particular program is a function of the molecule and chemical
class, disease and disease stage, and outcome that a firm tests, as well as scientific obstacles and opportunities that present themselves. Second, it presents
empirical findings about the length of premarket programs from 1984 to 2016
using a dataset of regulatory milestones made public through FDA’s implementation of the patent term restoration provisions of the 1984 statute. This is
the first piece of scholarship to combine these data with the listed patents on
those drugs, the initial labeling approved by FDA for those drugs, and their
therapeutic categorizations, and the first to use these data to offer comprehensive descriptive statistics about the relationship between drug types and premarket timelines.13
organizations, and academics convened to explore the “well-reported pull-out of pharmaceutical companies from neuroscience research” in the prior year); Kenneth Singletary, Pfizer Will Cut 300 Jobs as It Halts Development of Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s
Drugs,
BOS.
GLOBE
(Jan.
7,
2018),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2018/01/07/pfizer-will-cut-jobs-halts-development-alzheimer-and-parkinson-drugs/AQPNfKywb1KWQBbWrIuTmN/story.html.
12. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PROPELLING INNOVATION IN DRUG
DISCOVERY,
DEVELOPMENT,
AND
EVALUATION
9–10
(Sept.
2012),
https://www.broadinstitute.org/files/sections/about/PCAST/2012%20pcast-fda.pdf
[hereinafter PCAST REPORT].
13. The focus and methodology of this Article differ from what has been done in
the handful of empirical pieces working from patent term restoration data in the past.
See Jaime F. Cárdenas-Navia, Thirty Years of Flawed Incentives: An Empirical and
Economic Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Restoration, 29 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1301 (2014) (presenting analysis that does not examine therapeutic categories or
consider the regulatory paradigm and that does not differentiate human drugs from animal drugs, although they are subject to different approval requirements); Suzan Kucukarslan & Jacqueline Cole, Patent Extension Under the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 511 (1994) (presenting
analysis that does not examine therapeutic categories, did not find all relevant regulatory milestones, and relied on secondary sources for information about exclusivity);
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? FollowOn Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 299, 311, 331 (2010) (relying on list of restored patents published on PTO
website, which omits more than fifty restored drug patents, and relying on Kucukarslan’s characterization of exclusivity status).
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The findings are significant. The time from earliest patent filing to the
earliest human trials has been getting shorter. The average clinical testing period generally hovers between five and seven years, but applications submitted
at the end of the time period in the dataset had longer clinical programs than
applications submitted earlier. There is an upward trend. One in ten drugs in
the dataset had a clinical testing period exceeding ten years, and more than one
in four had a clinical testing period exceeding seven years. There are significant differences in the length of the average clinical testing period by therapeutic category; for instance, central nervous system drugs, antipsychotics, antidepressants, anticonvulsants, and anti-Parkinson’s agents take significantly
longer in clinical testing than antibiotic and antiviral drugs. Drugs intended for
acute use take less time to develop than drugs intended for chronic use, and
there may be a correlation between the pharmacologic class of a drug and the
length of the clinical timeline.
As the conclusion explains, these findings have implications for innovation policy. To avoid systematically under-incentivizing entire areas of medical research, we may need to break the paradox – that is, ensure that longer
premarket programs do not lead to shorter (or flat) marketing exclusivity.

II. THE THEORY OF NEW DRUG APPROVAL
The theory of new drug approval lies at the heart of the drug innovation
paradox. FDA approves a product – meaning not only a tangible article but the
words that recommend the conditions of the drug’s use and describe the expected outcome if the article is administered under those conditions – on the
basis of what is known about the product. What is known about the product, in
turn, depends on the premarket research and development performed by the
product’s sponsor. This theory of new drug approval was forged in the middle
part of the last century.14 Today the premarket paradigm implements that theory and reflects decades of continuous (and continuing) evolution in clinical
trial design and statistical methodology. The relationship between what we can
say about a particular product, on the one hand, and how exactly we know it,
on the other hand, has grown more sophisticated and complex.

A. The Early Decades
The modern drug approval paradigm emerged in the middle part of the
twentieth century. In the early decades of the century, the predecessors of today’s large pharmaceutical companies were beginning to develop methods of
testing their drugs for effectiveness, but both their testing and the regulatory
oversight were minimal by today’s standards. Many believed that physicians
were the best judges of the effectiveness of medicines.

14. Kara W. Swanson, Food and Drug Law as Intellectual Property Law: Historical Reflections, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 331, 373 (2011).
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U.S. drug companies in the 1800s and early 1900s fell mainly into two
categories. First, some companies offered “patent medicines.”15 These medicines should not be confused with “patented” drugs. They were heavily advertised to the general public and available without a doctor’s prescription (though
sometimes prescribed), and the ingredients were typically kept secret. Some
claims were grandiose.16 Second, the predecessors of today’s pharmaceutical
industry, including many companies still in existence today in one form or another, instead offered “ethical drugs” – generally to physicians, for prescribing
to patients.17 The ethical drug companies usually disclosed the ingredients of
their products and explained the basis for the claims they made about their
products.18 Even in the 1800s many studied their products both before and
after market entry, although this mainly consisted of drawing conclusions from
case histories and surveys of physicians.19

15. Id. at 352–53; Joseph M. Gabriel, The Testing of Sanocrysin: Science, Profit,
and Innovation in Clinical Trial Design, 1926–31, 69 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 604,
609 (2013).
16. The traditional view holds that patent medicine was little more than quackery.
See JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
PATENT MEDICINES IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 209 (1961); ERIC W.
BOYLE, QUACK MEDICINE: A HISTORY OF COMBATING HEALTH FRAUD IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 10–11 (2013). Recent archival work suggests a much more nuanced view and does not seem to support the idea that patent medicine makers were
duplicitous. See generally JOSEPH M. GABRIEL, MEDICAL MONOPOLY: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2–
3 (2014) [hereinafter MEDICAL MONOPOLY] (with also an emphasis on chapters 1 and
2).
17. Nicolas Rasmussen, The Drug Industry and Clinical Research in Interwar
America: Three Types of Physician Collaborator, 79 BULL. HIST. MED. 50, 53 (2005).
18. Id.
19. MEDICAL MONOPOLY, supra note 16, at 157–58; see also Suzanne White Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm304485.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2018) (providing historical background). It is possible that premarket effectiveness testing would have run into problems under state law, which at
the time viewed experimentation on actual patients (at least with respect to surgery) as
medical malpractice. See, e.g., Jackson v. Burnham, 39 P. 577, 580 (Colo. 1895)
(“There must be some criterion by which to test the proper mode of treatment in a given
case; and, when a particular mode of treatment is upheld by a consensus of opinion
among the members of the profession, it should be followed by the ordinary practitioner; and, if a physician sees fit to experiment with some other mode, he should do so
at his peril.”); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 122 (1768) (“For it hath been solemnly resolved that mala praxis is a grave
misdemeanor and offence at common law, whether it be for curiosity and experiment, or by neglect; because it breaks the trust which a party has placed in his physician, and tends to the patient’s destruction.”). Views on experimentation did not begin
to change until the 1930s. See, e.g., Fortner v. Koch, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (Mich. 1935)
(“We recognize the fact that, if the general practice of medicine and surgery is to pro-
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Reformers at the turn of the last century, which included the orthodox
medical community and more progressive members of the ethical drug industry, sought to shut down patent medicine or at least rein in exaggerated claims
and ensure safety testing.20 In 1906 they succeeded in securing passage of the
Pure Food and Drugs Act, which – although a brief statute by today’s standards
– prohibited statements in drug packaging or labels that were “false or misleading in any particular.”21 After a Supreme Court decision in 1911 put an end to
the Bureau of Chemistry’s efforts to prosecute companies for false claims of
effectiveness,22 Congress amended the statute to prohibit false and fraudulent
claims regarding the curative or therapeutic effects of a drug.23 Again, though,
despite the Bureau of Chemistry’s now explicit authority to police effectiveness claims, the Court reined the agency in; a company could defend itself on
the basis of a personal belief in its claims.24
The Court’s reluctance to permit the government oversight authority with
respect to therapeutic claims may have reflected prevailing sentiment that effectiveness was a matter of personal opinion. In 1911, presented with a “Blood
Purifier” (which “enters the circulation at once, utterly destroying and removing impurities from the blood and entire system” and “gives splendid results in
the treatment of cancer”) and “Special No. 4” (which “will remove swelling,
arrest development, restore circulation, and remove pain” and “[i]s indicated
in all cases of malignancy where there is a tendency of the disease to spread”),
the Court concluded that Congress would not have meant to regulate “in regions where opinions are far apart.”25 It noted a case from nine years earlier,
in which it had written that “the effectiveness of almost any particular method
of treatment of disease is, to a more or less extent, a fruitful source of difference

gress, there must be a certain amount of experimentation carried on; but such experiments must be done with the knowledge and consent of the patient or those responsible
for him, and must not vary too radically from the accepted method of procedure.”).
20. BOYLE, supra note 16, at 17–19.
21. Pure Food Act, Pub. L. No. 59–384, 34 Stat. 768, 768–72 (1906). This Article
does not consider biological products, which have been regulated under a different statutory scheme since 1902. See Pub. L. No. 57–244, 32 Stat. 728, 728–29 (1902).
22. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 498–99 (1911) (holding that the
scheme prohibited only false statements about the identity of the product).
23. Pub. L. No. 62–301, 37 Stat. 416, 416–17 (1912).
24. See, e.g., Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 513, 517 (1916) (holding
that “statement . . . regarding the curative or therapeutic effect” of a drug is “false and
fraudulent” only if made “with actual intent to deceive”); see also RUTH DEFOREST
LAMB, AMERICAN CHAMBER OF HORRORS: THE TRUTH ABOUT FOOD AND DRUGS 64–
66 (1936) (discussing acquittal of patent medicine maker following sale of horsetail
weed combined with peppermint oil and sugar to cure diabetes, largely because he had
received letters from patients praising the concoction and he therefore had “faith in his
product”).
25. Johnson, 221 U.S. at 498–500.
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of opinion, even though the great majority may be of one way of thinking.” 26
The Court’s reluctance may also have reflected the view – which the American
Medical Association (“AMA”) encouraged – that treating physicians were the
best judges of the effectiveness of medicines they prescribed.27 Indeed, the
AMA stepped forward with a scheme for assessing effectiveness claims; it
would provide a stamp of approval if, in its judgment, the claims about a drug’s
therapeutic properties were not false.28 The scheme was voluntary, but the
AMA expected clinical data and developed a set of principles for support of
claims, which the agency – renamed the “Food and Drug Administration” in
1930 – embraced.29

B. Premarket Testing for Effectiveness
Tragedy struck in 1937: more than one hundred deaths, many of them
children with streptococcus infections, from a sulfanilamide preparation that
had not been adequately tested for safety.30 This provided the final impetus for
reform legislation, which had been brewing for several years. The 1938 statute
required companies to notify FDA prior to introducing new drugs to the market
and required them to provide evidence of safety, generated in “adequate tests
by all methods reasonably applicable” to determine whether the drug was
safe.31
Although the statute did not require premarket proof of effectiveness,
FDA considered the therapeutic value of new drugs when it reviewed new drug
applications (“NDAs”).32 Few drugs are safe in an absolute sense. The conclusion that a drug is “safe” must be contextualized; it means “safe, in light of
the potential benefits.”33 If a drug was offered for treatment of a serious and
26. Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 105–06 (1902)
(finding therefore that statements about effectiveness are not an appropriate focus for
mail fraud prosecution).
27. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 16, at 30. This view persisted well into the twentieth century. Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation: The Real Voice – II, NEW YORKER,
Mar. 21, 1964, at 75 (quoting American Medical Association spokesperson that “only
the individual physician [can] determine the efficacy of a given drug in the treatment
of a given patient”).
28. BOYLE, supra note 16, at 39; see also HARRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF
EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE AND THERAPEUTIC REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1990
at 147 (1997).
29. See BOYLE, supra note 16, at 39–40; see infra Part II.C.
30. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 85–92 (2010).
31. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75–717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1938)).
32. Junod, supra note 19.
33. Robert Temple, Development of Drug Law, Regulations, and Guidance in the
United States, in GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF DRUGS 1643, 1644 (Paul L. Munson
et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Temple, Development of Drug Law] (explaining that “the
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progressive, or life-threatening condition or if it had the potential for toxic side
effects, for instance, the agency of the 1940s and 1950s considered its therapeutic potential when assessing it under the statutory safety standard.34
Over these same decades, academic statisticians and scientists, industry,
and regulators worked to develop a framework for clinical testing that would
reliably separate drugs with therapeutic benefit from drugs without therapeutic
benefit.35 As a result of this work the modern clinical efficacy trial emerged in
the 1940s and 1950s. Controlled trials, in which subjects receiving experimental treatment are compared with subjects who do not receive experimental
treatment, were not new. Nor was the concept of a placebo – a sham treatment
provided to some subjects to address concern that the psychological effect of
receiving medicine contributes to patient improvement.36 British epidemiologist and medical statistician, Austin Bradford Hill, added the final two elements: rigorous statistical analysis of the trial results and design of the trial
with the final statistical analysis in mind.37

required showing of safety in the 1938 law . . . had always had some elements of weighing benefit against risk”). Dr. Temple currently serves as Deputy Director for Clinical
Science in the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (“CDER”). See also United
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555–56 (1979) (“For the terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not
offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit.”).
34. Drug Safety: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov’t Operations Part I, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 150 (1964) (testimony of George Larrick, Commissioner of Food and Drugs) (“Of course the question of benefit was an integral part
of the safety question in dealing with a product to be used in a life-threatening disease
such as pneumonia or in dealing with a drug presenting grave risks. We required information about effectiveness for such drugs in order to reach a decision about safety.”).
35. Recent historical work suggests that the ethical drug firms embraced the new
methods as a way to differentiate their drugs from quack medicine. See, e.g., Gabriel,
supra note 15, at 605–06 (arguing that the ethical companies were motivated by both
commercial and scientific considerations and “enthusiastically embraced rigorous scientific research”); Rasmussen, supra note 17, at 50 (discussing the “mutual accommodation between ethical drug firms and academic clinical researchers” between the wars,
when commercial sponsorship of modern clinical trials, at academic institutions,
emerged). Earlier work suggested most of the impetus for this work came from reformers. See, e.g., MARKS, supra note 28, at 138, 150–51.
36. The concepts had even been combined by Parke-Davis (now part of Pfizer) in
1926. Gabriel, supra note 15, at 604–05. The company tested Sanocrysin (an injectable
gold compound) for the treatment of tuberculosis, separating twenty-four patients into
two groups by coin toss and administering a placebo sterile water injection to the control group. Id.
37. See John R. Hampton, Evidence-Based Medicine, Opinion-Based Medicine,
and Real-World Medicine, 45 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 549, 556 (2002); Roger Collier,
Legumes, Lemons and Streptomycin: A Short History of the Clinical Trial, 180
CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 23, 24 (2009).
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Hill designed the 1946 trial of streptomycin, an antibiotic, for treatment
of patients with tuberculosis.38 Post-war funding constraints meant the United
Kingdom’s Medical Research Council received only a small supply of streptomycin for research, requiring the trial team to determine how to prove efficacy
with only a small number of patients receiving treatment.39 Hill devised a protocol with inclusion and exclusion criteria, a concurrent control, randomization
of enrolled subjects to treatment or control using statistical methods and sealed
envelopes, an objective endpoint (x-rays) read by radiologists who were
“blinded” to whether the subject had received treatment or control, and rigorous statistical analysis of the results.40 The patients knew if they were receiving
streptomycin.41 Even without the additional blinding of patients (“doubleblinding”) that is preferred today, the use of a concurrent control, combined
with Hill’s statistical approach, conclusively demonstrated cure of tuberculosis.42

C. “Adequate and Well-Controlled” Clinical Trials
FDA embraced the emerging clinical trial and statistical methodologies,
confirming repeatedly its interest in rigorous study design and its expectation
that new drug applicants would submit effectiveness data. In the early 1940s
three agency officials and a representative of the AMA published an article in
the Journal of the American Medical Association, describing the clinical trial
design and data analysis standards the AMA had been applying for evaluation
of efficacy data.43 In the 1950s, new regulations for marketing applications
required that every application include a “full statement” of the “therapeutic
results observed” – that is, information on effectiveness.44 These regulations
further conveyed an expectation of study rigor by indicating that safety testing
should be performed by “experts, qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety of drugs.”45 In the fall of 1962, FDA proposed

38. Geoffrey Marshall et al., Streptomycin Treatment of Pulmonary Tuberculosis:
A Medical Research Council Investigation, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 769, 769–70 (1948).
39. Id. at 769.
40. Id. at 770.
41. Id.; see also Hampton, supra note 37, at 556.
42. Marshall et al., supra note 38, at 780–81; see also Jeffrey Peppercorn et al.,
History of Clinical Trial Development and the Pharmaceutical Industry, in
PHARMACEUTICAL SCIENCES ENCYCLOPEDIA: DRUG DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND
MANUFACTURING 1, 7 (Shayne C. Gad ed., 2010).
43. Walton Van Winkle, Jr., et al., Laboratory and Clinical Appraisal of New
Drugs, 126 JAMA 958 (1944).
44. Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
21 Fed. Reg. 5576, 5578 (July 25, 1956) (promulgating 21 C.F.R. § 130.4, describing
the contents of a new drug application).
45. Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
21 Fed. Reg. at 5578.
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regulations to reshape the premarket clinical trial process.46 This proposal laid
out the now well-accepted sequence of preclinical safety testing, followed by
a formal submission to the agency – known today as the investigational new
drug application (“IND”) – before clinical trials.47 It also emphasized the role
of effectiveness data; an IND would not be accepted unless the sponsor planned
to collect a case history for every subject, with information about results and
an opinion whether useful results were attributable to the drug under investigation.48
The Kefauver-Harris amendments, passed in October 1962, imposed a
new drug approval requirement, formally shifting the burden of proof to drug
sponsors.49 The statute also expressly required proof of effectiveness, in addition to proof of safety.50 But these are not the aspects of the legislation most
important to understanding the impact of the innovation paradox in the field of
medicine. The effectiveness requirement was not novel, after all. Instead, the
most significant aspects were the specification of an evidentiary standard for
new drugs, tied directly to the words used in the labeling to describe the results
that could be expected, and the specification of a clinical trial methodology.51
Specifically, a new drug application required substantial evidence of effectiveness under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
labeling.52 Substantial evidence in turn meant data from adequate and wellcontrolled investigations, including clinical (human) investigations.53 By
1970, FDA had explained that this embodied the principles of study design and
data analysis that had been developing in the preceding decades: a method of
subject selection that reduces variability, assignment of subjects to test groups

46. New Drugs for Investigational Use: Proposed Exemptions, 27 Fed. Reg. 7990,
7990–91 (Aug. 10, 1962).
47. Id. An IND would describe the preclinical investigations showing that it was
reasonably safe to start human trials, and it would identify and describe the clinical
investigators. Id. at 7990. It would also explain the nature and duration of every
planned stage of investigation. Id. at 7991. Prior regulations exempting investigational
new drugs from the NDA requirement had imposed only modest labeling and recordkeeping requirements. 21 C.F.R. § 130.3 (1962).
48. New Drugs for Investigational Use: Proposed Exemptions, 27 Fed. Reg. at
7992.
49. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87–781, § 103, 76 Stat. 780, 783
(1962) (amending Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) § 505).
50. Id. § 102(a), 76 Stat. at 781 (amending FDCA § 201(p)).
51. Cf. Temple, Development of Drug Law, supra note 33, at 1650 (“[T]he impression that the critical event in 1962 was the effectiveness requirement is wrong and
over-simple.”); Junod, supra note 19 (arguing that the strength of the new law was not
the substantial evidence provision but its focus on study methods); Leonard G. Schifrin,
Lessons from the Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the 1962 Drug Regulations, 5
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 101–02 (1982) (suggesting that the thrust of the 1962
amendments was tying proof to claims and thus narrowing the scope of the latter).
52. § 102(c), 76 Stat. at 781 (amending FDCA § 505(d)).
53. Id.
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in a way that minimizes bias, use of a control, methods of observing and recording results that minimize bias on the part of the subject and the observer,
quantitative results, and evaluation of results using appropriate statistical methods.54
Over the years, FDA and the more experienced pharmaceutical firms have
worked together to refine their shared expectations about clinical trial design
and data analysis.55 For instance, nearly three decades after the agency issued
its regulation explaining “adequate and well-controlled trials,” it observed that
the “science and practice of drug development and clinical evaluation ha[d]
evolved significantly,” prompting it to issue comprehensive guidance on
demonstrating efficacy.56 In that same time, statistical methods also grew more
complex and sophisticated.57 Citing a “proliferation of statistical research in
the area of clinical trials,” FDA and its peer regulators in Japan and Europe
developed joint guidance on the principles of statistical methodology applied
to clinical trials.58 FDA’s 1998 document lays out the agency’s expectations
regarding the statistical issues associated with trial design, trial conduct, and
data analysis.59
FDA also notes in this document that better understanding of the pathogenesis of disease and disease staging as well as progress in clinical evaluation
and clinical pharmacology affect the amount and type of data needed to support
approval in any particular case.60 Indeed, the evolution since 1962 has uncov-

54. Hearing Regulations and Regulations Describing Scientific Content of Adequate and Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 7250, 7250–51 (May
8, 1970) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130); see also 21 C.F.R. § 130.12(a)(5)(ii)
(1970) (claiming that the new regulation restated principles that had been “developed
over a period of years” and were now “recognized by the scientific community as the
essentials of adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations”).
55. See generally CARPENTER, supra note 30, at 495–96 (arguing that some of the
standards “were advanced by the Bureau of Medicine, but also . . . were developments
. . . at the intersection of science, regulation, and more progressive elements of the
pharmaceutical industry”).
56. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: PROVIDING CLINICAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUGS
AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 2, 16 (May 1998), https://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/briefing/2006-4227B1-02-02-FDA-Appendix1.pdf [hereinafter CLINICAL
EFFICACY GUIDANCE].
57. See Anthony C. Segreti et al., Biopharmaceutical Statistics in a Pharmaceutical Regulated Environment: Past, Present, and Future, 11 J. BIOPHARMACEUTICAL
STAT. 347, 348–65 (2001) (providing an accessible history of biopharmaceutical statistical practices and requirements from 1975 to 2000).
58. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: E9 STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES FOR CLINICAL TRIALS 1 (Sept. 1998),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm073137.pdf [hereinafter FDA, E9 GUIDANCE].
59. Id. at 14–34.
60. See id. at 2.
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ered an important truth: data expectations and the clinical trial designs to produce those data vary considerably. The agency has now issued more than two
dozen guidelines regarding clinical trial design and data requirements, therapeutic class by therapeutic class.61 Part IV of this Article explores this variability.

D. New Drug Approval Theory
The modern drug approval paradigm traces its origins to the 1962 amendments. As written in statute and implemented by FDA in the decades that followed, the paradigm reflects two basic principles that together comprise new
drug approval theory: first, FDA’s authority over a new drug derives from and
revolves around the words used to describe the drug, and second, the research
performed by the drug’s sponsor defines the drug.
As a general rule, it is words – not substances – that trigger FDA’s drug
authority. Under federal law, an article is a “drug” regulated by FDA if the
article is intended for a particular type of use – to treat a disease, for instance.62
This refers to the objective intended use of the item, which is generally determined by reference to express claims made by the product’s manufacturer.63
Thus, for instance, thalidomide is simply a chemical substance unless and until
it is labeled for use in treatment of multiple myeloma. Further, a drug is a “new
drug” that requires an NDA if it is not generally recognized as safe and effective for the uses described in its labeling.64 Labeling broadly means any written
or printed material associated with both the manufacturer and the product.65
61. Temple, supra note 33, at 1646 (noting FDA’s “increasingly strenuous attempts to make known what its requirements for approval would be” and the “nearly
30 drug class clinical guidelines . . . describing in detail the study designs and expected
data for particular therapeutic classes”).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2012).
63. S. REP. NO. 74-361, at 4 (1935) (“The use to which the product is to be put will
determine the category into which it will fall. . . . The manufacturer of the article,
through his representations in connection with its sale, can determine the use to which
the article is to be put.”); Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 238–
39 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (treating this Senate passage as authoritative); United States v. An
Article Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles, 409 F.2d 734, 739 n.3 (2d Cir. 1969) (following same interpretation); United States v. 23, More or Less, Articles, 192 F.2d 308,
310 (2d Cir. 1951) (same). Intended use is the intent communicated in the market generally through claims and representations in a product’s labeling and advertising. See
Brief for Respondent R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. at 12 n.11, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (No. 98-1152) (brief authored by former
Chief Counsel of FDA, noting that “intent is ‘objective’ in that its locus is not the mind
of any person, but the marketing communications, themselves”); see also 21 C.F.R. §§
201.128, 801.4 (2017) (defining intended use).
64. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(p)(1) (West 2018).
65. Id. § 321(m); Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 348, 350 (1948) (holding
that pamphlets shipped by drug maker under separate cover were “labeling” because of
their “textual relationship” to the drugs, that is, they “explained their uses”).
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Words, in labeling written by a company about its product, make an article a
new drug that requires an NDA.
The application in turn must show that the drug is safe for use under the
conditions described in the labeling, and it must provide substantial evidence
that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the
conditions described in the labeling.66 The application therefore describes the
product (including how it is made) and proposes labeling.67 The company’s
research program and results – which are presented in its application – must
prove what is proposed for the labeling of the product. Regardless of the accuracy of the initially proposed labeling, when FDA approves the drug product,
it will approve only labeling that reflects what the research proved.68
The labeling approved by FDA tells prescribers about the specific medical conditions for which the drug has been approved (its “indications”) and
describes the outcomes that can be expected under specific conditions of use
(such as dosing). Agency regulations specify precisely what must, may, and
may not be included in the labeling.69 These regulations require the labeling
to synthesize the information in the application – especially the research design
and results – into digestible advice for prescribers.70 For instance, the labeling
must describe every clinical trial that would facilitate understanding how to use
the drug safely and effectively.71 If a particular study supported effectiveness
for the labeled indication, the labeling must describe the study design and its
results.72 If evidence is lacking with respect to a particular subpopulation, the
labeling must describe this limitation succinctly.73 Special instructions for distinct populations may be included, based on the data in the clinical trials.74
Every section of the labeling is grounded in the application submitted and in
the company’s and agency’s analysis of the data and information in the application.
FDA’s approval of an application and thus a product and labeling represents its conclusion that the drug is safe and effective under the conditions of
use in that labeling – for that indication, with those dosing instructions, subject

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d) (West 2018).
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2017).
21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d)(1)–(5), (7) (West 2018).
21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (2017).
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drugs and Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg.
81082, 81082 (proposed Dec. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201) (referring
to the professional labeling as “the primary mechanism through which FDA and drug
manufacturers communicate essential, science-based prescribing information to health
care professionals” and noting that it “is a compilation of information based on a thorough analysis of the new drug application”).
71. § 201.57(c)(15).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 201.57(c)(2)(i)(B).
74. Id. § 201.57(c)(9)(vi).
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to those warnings and precautions.75 The 1962 amendments linked clinical
trial design and the resulting data to the words that would be approved by FDA
in connection with approval of the drug. Because the agency approves both
the tangible item and its labeling together as a single unit, modern drug approval theory means that research design and results dictate the scope of the
approval and thus define the product approved for patients.

III. INCENTIVES FOR DRUG INNOVATION
The primary incentive to discover and develop a new medicine in the
United States is the prospect of a period for exclusive marketing – commercialization without competition from cheaper copycat products. During this
period, the company may be able to recover the investment it made in developing the medicine as well as others that are less successful or that failed before
approval, and it may be able to enjoy a profit.76 This period is made possible
by several features of federal law, the most significant of which are protection
of patents associated with the medicine and protection of research data gathered during testing under the drug approval statute.

A. Patent Exclusivity
Federal law permits the patenting of any “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” as well as any “new and useful
improvement[s] thereof,” provided the other conditions and requirements of
the Patent Act are satisfied.77 The sponsor of a new drug may own (or exclusively license) a variety of patents in connection with that drug.
For instance, the sponsor may own a patent claiming the drug’s active
ingredient, which in simple terms is the component of the product that furnishes its pharmacological activity.78 The active ingredient directly effects the
75. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d) (West 2018).
76. Henry Grabowski et al., The Roles of Patents and Research and Development

Incentives in Biopharmaceutical Innovation, 34 HEALTH AFF. 302, 302 (2015) (“Patents and other forms of intellectual property protection are generally thought to play
essential roles in encouraging innovation in biopharmaceuticals.”); Mark A. Lemley,
The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 114–15 (2013) (“In the
pharmaceutical industry the government requires perhaps ten years of safety and efficacy review, costing hundreds of millions of dollars in research, development, testing,
and marketing, before allowing the launch of a pharmaceutical product. . . . The patent
system guarantees insulation from competition for a substantial period of time so companies can recover the money the government made them invest in the first place.”
(footnote omitted)).
77. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
78. FDA uses the phrase “active moiety” for the biologically active substance at
the site of action at the body and the phrase “active ingredient” for the substance as
introduced to the body. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2017); Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d
984, 987–88 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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treatment of the disease in question.79 FDA calls this a “drug substance” patent.80 Patent law provides an inventor with a strong incentive to file the application for this patent as early as possible. This is because, as a general rule,
a patent will be denied if the invention was in “public use” for more than a year
before the patent application was filed.81 Although the matter is not entirely
free from doubt, use of an invention in a clinical trial may in some cases constitute public use.82 Publication of the invention more than a year before the
patent application can similarly lead to denial of the patent.83 Conventional
wisdom holds that new drug sponsors should and do file for active ingredient
patents before clinical testing.84
It is possible to file well before clinical testing begins because patent law
does not require proof of safety and effectiveness in the FDA regulatory sense.
The goal of the regulatory premarket program for a new drug is to show that
the benefits (the therapeutic outcomes assessed in hypothesis-testing human
trials) of the finished product (active ingredient, formulation, route of administration, dosage form, and strength) outweigh its risks when the product is used
as described in its labeling.85 Safety and effectiveness are clinical and regulatory concepts and evolving ones at that. Patent law imposes its own “utility”
79. In addition to treating a disease, a drug (and thus its active ingredient, which
is also a drug) can diagnose, cure, mitigate, or prevent a disease or affect the structure
or function of the body. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(g)(1) (West 2018).
80. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2017).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012). Congress reworked this provision in 2011, but
the basic concept remains true today. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011).
82. See Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MO. L. REV. 645, 659–60 (2011) (discussing the “not
entirely unambiguous” issue of whether human clinical trials are patent-invalidating
public use of the claimed invention). In 2013, the Federal Circuit reversed a lower
court summary judgment of invalidity grounded in a finding that a clinical trial constituted clear and convincing evidence of public use. Dey, L.P. v. Sunovian Pharm., Inc.,
715 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The matter was remanded to determine whether
the study was conducted with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality as to the nature of the formulations tested. Id. at 1360.
83. See, e.g., Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs, Ltd., 476 F.3d
1321, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining how a prior publication forced OrthoMcNeil to narrow the scope of its patent); Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and
the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 522–24 (2009) (offering numerous
examples).
84. See, e.g., Roin, supra note 83, at 539 (stating that “[p]harmaceutical patents
are typically filed when drugs are in early preclinical research”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345,
348 (2007) (noting that applications for “composition of matter” patents are filed before
clinical testing of a molecule begins).
85. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(viii) (2017) (requiring NDAs to discuss “why the
benefits exceed the risks under the conditions stated in the labeling”); FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CRITICAL PATH OPPORTUNITIES
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requirement, the contours of which are admittedly much debated, but it has
been clear for almost forty years that with respect to substances that may ultimately comprise part of a new drug product approved by FDA, utility is a question of having a desirable biological activity and ordinarily can be demonstrated with preclinical evidence.86
In addition to the active ingredient patent, the sponsor of a medicine may
hold a patent claiming the formulation or composition of the particular finished
product.87 For instance, the patent might claim the particular combination of
active and inactive ingredients or the particular dosage form and dosage.88
FDA calls these “drug product” patents.89 The sponsor might hold a patent
claiming an approved method of using or administering the product, which
FDA calls a “use” patent.90 Other possibilities include patents claiming the
manufacturing process, claiming an intermediate chemical entity used during
the manufacturing process, or claiming a metabolite of the active ingredient.91

REPORT at R-8 (2006), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/scienceresearch/specialtopics/criticalpathinitiative/criticalpathopportunitiesreports/ucm077254.pdf [hereinafter
FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT] (suggesting approval once “uncertainty” about benefitrisk balance has been “reduced to an acceptable level”); see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) (FDA “generally considers a drug safe when the expected therapeutic gain justifies the risk entailed by its use.”).
86. See Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (finding utility on
the basis of data demonstrating pharmacodynamic activity in animals, specifically,
stimulating smooth muscle tissue in gerbils and modulating blood pressure in rats);
Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding utility on basis of in
vitro demonstration of the claimed biological activity, that is, preventing aggregation
of platelets); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that
“proof of an alleged pharmaceutical property for a compound by statistically significant
tests with standard experimental animals is sufficient to establish utility” and stating
court’s “firm conviction that one who has taught the public that a compound exhibits
some desirable pharmaceutical property in a standard experimental animal has made a
significant and useful contribution to the art, even though it may eventually appear that
the compound is without value in the treatment in humans” (quoting In re Krimmel,
292 F.2d 948, 953 (C.C.P.A. 1961)); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107.03 (9th ed. 2017) (requiring evidence “that
reasonably supports” pharmacological or therapeutic utility and noting that data from
in vitro or animal testing “is generally sufficient”).
87. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2017).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS at
ADB31–ADB78 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf [hereinafter APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS] (describing
various use patents).
91. § 314.53(b); see generally JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW
38–46 (2005) (listing numerous types of pharmaceutical patent claims).
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Through the 1970s, as the modern new drug premarket paradigm took
shape, scholars and policymakers became aware of diminishing effective patent life. Because inventors typically file active ingredient patent applications
before clinical testing starts, these patents tend to issue before or during the
trials. At the time, a patent lasted for seventeen years from issuance.92 Today,
it generally lasts for twenty years from the filing of the patent application.93 In
either case, a significant portion of the term of an active ingredient patent may
lapse before FDA approves the marketing application. This shortens the period
of time that the drug sponsor may exploit the invention in the market while
enjoying patent rights. Numerous studies in the 1970s and early 1980s documented a significant decline in the effective patent life of new drugs over the
preceding decades.94 Other studies pointed out that the length of the premarket
process had increased substantially,95 and still others documented a decline in
the rate of new drug introductions.96 Some studies linked the decline in new
drug introductions to increased regulatory requirements.97 Others suggested
92. 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (1984).
93. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (West 2018). Congress changed the term in the Uru-

guay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), to implement the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994, part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral
negotiations that transformed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade into the
World Trade Organization. For patents issued on or after June 8, 1995, the term is
twenty years from the patent application or, if the application contains a specific reference to an earlier filed application, twenty years from the date of that application. §
154 (a)(2). Patents in force on June 8, 1995, or that issued on applications pending on
that date, lasted either twenty years from application or seventeen years from issuance,
whichever ended later. Id. § 154(c)(1).
94. See Schifrin, supra note 51, at 116–19 (surveying literature on decline in effective patent life by 1982); Peter Barton Hutt, The Importance of Patent Term Restoration to Pharmaceutical Innovation, 1 HEALTH AFF. 6, 16–17 (1982) (noting that
“[t]he effective patent life of the NCE drugs approved by FDA in 1980 and 1981 was
less than half the seventeen years provided by Congress” and listing studies to date).
95. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON SCI., RESEARCH AND TECH., 96TH CONG., THE FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION’S PROCESS FOR APPROVING NEW DRUGS 81 (Comm. Print
1980) (finding it took four to six years on average to conduct clinical testing for approval); Martin Eisman & William Wardell, The Decline in Effective Patent Life of New
Drugs, 24 RES. MGMT. 18, 19 (1981) (showing increase in clinical testing period from
5.9 years in 1968 to 8.3 years in 1979); Lewis H. Sarett, FDA Regulations and Their
Influence on Future R&D, 17 RES. MGMT. 18, 18 (1974) (reporting that average product
development time had increased from two years in 1958–62 to 5.5–8 years in 1968–
72).
96. See Schifrin, supra note 51, at 93 (noting that comparisons of rates of introduction before 1962 and after 1962 generally showed decline in the 1960s and 1970s).
In fact, new molecular entities had entered the market at a rate of nearly twenty per year
in the 1950s, and the pace dropped to fifteen or below in the 1960s and 1970s. Michael
S. Kinch et al., An Overview of FDA-Approved New Molecular Entities: 1827–2013,
19 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 1033, 1034 fig.1 (2014).
97. One influential study compared the actual flow of new chemical entities from
1962 to 1969 with the flow predicted from a regression of the determinants of the flow
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that drug researchers had finished the easy work and that the challenges of developing treatments for chronic diseases were harder and more time consuming.98 Still others noted that the explanations were not mutually exclusive.99
Together these studies informed enactment of section 156 of the Patent
Act in 1984.100 Section 156 allows the PTO to restore a portion of the term of
one patent associated with a product that underwent regulatory review prior to
commercial marketing.101 Restoration of the patent is subject to numerous conditions, the most significant of which is that the regulatory review must result
in the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the active ingredient in
question.102 Also PTO will not restore any portion of the regulatory review
period that occurred prior to patent issuance.103
Patent protection for new drugs remains paradoxical, however, because
the statutory formula limits the number of days recoverable. Although it directs PTO to restore all of the patent term that lapses while FDA reviews a new
drug application, it permits restoration of only half of the clinical testing period.104 The clinical testing period begins when FDA authorizes clinical trials
by permitting an IND to go into effect and ends when the applicant submits its

prior to 1962. SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE
1962 AMENDMENTS 10 (1974). This study showed that the actual flow in the 1960s was
half of what had been predicted. Id.
98. See, e.g., JOHN W. EGAN ET AL., ECONOMICS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 104 (1982); see also Viviane Quirke, From Alkaloids to Gene Therapy: A
Brief History of Drug Discovery in the 20th Century, in MAKING MEDICINES 177, 197
(Stuart Anderson ed., 2005) (noting theories for the slowing pace by 1975, including
both the post-1962 regulatory requirements and the possibility that early drug discoveries had been providential, while “purposeful search[es] . . . take[] much longer”).
99. One study attributed fifty percent of the U.S. lag to a worldwide depletion of
research opportunities and fifty percent to U.S. regulatory policy, after comparing the
rate and timing of new drug introductions in the United States with the rate and timing
in other countries. Henry G. Grabowski, Drug Regulation and Innovation: Empirical
Evidence and Policy Options, 66 J. PHARM. SCI. 911 (1976).
100. Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration, 66 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 526, 535–36
(1984) (providing history of the patent term restoration provisions of 1984); see generally Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999) (providing history of the
1984 statute).
101. In addition to new (human) drugs, patent term restoration is available for new
animal drugs, human and veterinary biological products, food additives, color additives, and medical devices. 35 U.S.C.A. § 156 (West 2018). Veterinary biological
products are regulated by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”)
within USDA. See 9 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2017). FDA regulates the other products. What
Does
FDA
Regulate?,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194879.htm (last updated
Dec. 19, 2017).
102. 35 U.S.C.A. § 156(a)(5)(A) (West 2018).
103. Id. § 156(c).
104. Id. § 156(c)(2).
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NDA.105 Thus, if the drug spent 1000 days in clinical trials, PTO will restore
only 500 days.106 Put another way, there is a fifty percent penalty for clinical
testing. Moreover, PTO awards no more than five years.107 Once the approval
period and half of the testing period are added, the final number will be rounded
down (if necessary) so that the new patent expiry date is no more than five
years after the original expiry date.108 Thus past a certain point in a research
program, every additional day of testing translates to a lost day of patent life.109
The paradox remains: the exclusive marketing period made possible by the patent is shorter for drugs with longer research programs.

B. Data Exclusivity
The period for exclusive marketing also derives from data exclusivity,
which is separate from patent exclusivity. In addition to adding section 156 to
the Patent Act, the 1984 legislation created a statutory pathway for approval of
generic drugs. A generic drug application omits safety and effectiveness information and instead relies on the research submitted by another applicant, without that applicant’s permission.110 It is thus an “abbreviated” new drug application. Data exclusivity is inherent in any licensure scheme that requires the
submission of data and that permits one company to rely on data in another
company’s submission. The rules must state when the later abbreviated application is permitted. Data exclusivity is unrelated to any patent protection the
first company might have.111
As a general rule, when FDA approves a new (never before approved)
active ingredient, generic applications citing that active ingredient cannot be
submitted for five years.112 This is known as “new chemical entity” (“NCE”)
exclusivity, due to FDA’s particular way of interpreting the statutory phrase
105. Id. § 156(g)(1)(B)(i).
106. If the patent in question issued on the 400th day of the testing period, PTO will

consider only the final 600 days and will restore only 300 days. See, e.g., id. §
156(c)(2).
107. Id. § 156(g)(6)(A).
108. The rule was different for a drug already in clinical trials when Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. See id. § 156(g)(6)(A)–(C).
109. There is also a fourteen-year limit on the effective patent life. Id. § 156(c)(3).
110. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2) (West 2018) (describing contents of ANDA); Lietzan,
supra note 4, at 106 (explaining reliance).
111. There is confusion in the literature over the terminology, with some writers
using “market exclusivity” to describe the period of time before generic applications
may be submitted or approved. See Lietzan, supra note 4, at 110–12 (discussing confusion). This Article uses “data exclusivity” to refer to the period of time during which
the innovator has exclusive rights to the data it submitted. Id. at 103.
112. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii). This is shortened to four years if the generic applicant challenges a patent claiming the innovator’s drug or a method of using that drug. Id. For
a more detailed discussion of the nuances of data exclusivity, see generally Lietzan,
supra note 4, at 134–50.
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that mentions “active ingredient.” The agency focuses on whether the “active
moiety” – the molecule responsible for the physiological or pharmacological
action of the drug – has been approved before.113 This is a narrower inquiry
than whether the drug’s active ingredient is new for purposes of patent term
restoration.114 Data exclusivity is not paradoxical in the way that patent exclusivity is paradoxical. It is, however, invariable. No matter how much time and
money a firm spends developing a new drug, its right to exclusive use of the
data it generates expires five years after the new drug’s approval.

IV. DRUG INNOVATION AND PARADOX
Once a patent application has been filed, any further time spent developing, testing, and refining a product before market launch results in a shorter
effective patent life.115 This structural point is true regardless of the field of
invention. Inventors face a variety of pressures that could increase their time
to market, ranging from prudential legal considerations (e.g., safety testing to
guide modifications that reduce liability exposure) to business considerations
(e.g., testing to guide modifications that optimize commercial appeal). Generally the fact that increased time to market leads to decreased effective patent
life should prompt efficient pre-launch behavior and may not raise public policy concerns.
With new drugs, however, there may be cause for concern. The design
and length of any particular premarket program depend on the chemical structure of the active ingredient, its mechanism of action, the disease and its biological pathways, the disease state targeted, the outcome tested, and even the
presence and nature of other treatments on the market. The way these factors
affect premarket timelines is largely beyond the sponsor’s control. A drug’s
sponsor has a different kind of control. Within a range of options largely dictated by the current state of scientific knowledge and by FDA regulatory requirements and culture, a company has choices about the disease and disease
stage to pursue and the outcomes or uses to investigate. It also has the choice

113. See Lietzan, supra note 4, at 135–36; 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2017).
114. The standard for patent term restoration is whether the active ingredient, or a

salt or ester thereof, has previously been approved. § 156. It is more forgiving, which
means that some new drugs receive patent term restoration but not NCE exclusivity.
See, e.g., Photocure ASA v. Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (rejecting
use of FDA “active moiety” approach and finding that methyl aminolevulinate hydrochloride was entitled to restoration, even though it was a methyl ester of the previously
approved aminolevulinate hydrochloride and therefore would not receive NCE status
at FDA).
115. When the patent term was measured from patent issuance, time spent developing, testing, and refining the product after issuance (and before market launch) resulted in a shorter effective patent life. Now that the patent term is measured from the
patent application, it is time after the application (and before market launch) that results
in shorter effective patent life.
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whether to continue with a project or examine another compound entirely. Rather than choices relating to the efficiency of a particular premarket process,
these are choices about the research goals – meaning a program’s overall objectives and a trial’s hypothesis – and therefore the type of product it will pursue. Rather than steering drug firms towards efficient premarket behavior, the
paradoxical effective patent life and flat data exclusivity period may steer them
away from particular fields altogether.

A. Trial Design, Efficacy Endpoints, and Scope of Approval
A modern drug development program culminates in adequate and wellcontrolled phase 3 trials designed to generate substantial evidence of effectiveness.116 The “endpoint” used in those trials has a profound influence on the
length of the trials and therefore the overall clinical program. As explained in
Part II.D., the research results dictate the content of the labeling and therefore
the scope of approval. This means the endpoints acceptable to FDA in any
particular situation will define the product that can be approved, and a firm’s
selection of one endpoint among choices (if there are any) is tantamount to
selection of the product to be pursued. In the end, certain products will require
phase 3 effectiveness endpoints that necessitate longer trials, triggering the innovation paradox.

1. Traditional Endpoints
The endpoint of a trial is a variable intended to reflect a desired outcome
that can be statistically analyzed to answer a research question.117 The basic
goal in endpoint selection is identification of a variable that will – if measured
as described in the protocol and assessed as specified in the data analysis plan,
and assuming positive results – support regulatory approval. As a practical
matter, the results generally must demonstrate diagnosis, cure, mitigation,

116. It is possible to obtain approval on the basis of one adequate and well-controlled trial. FDA approved the first HIV/AIDS drug, Retrovir (zidovudine), on the
basis of data from a single randomized trial – which some characterize as a phase 2 trial
– that was stopped on ethical grounds when the therapeutic value became clear.
CARPENTER, supra note 30, at 436; see generally id. at 428–57 (discussing in detail
FDA’s development of accelerated approval and fast-track processes in connection
with the AIDS crisis); see also CLINICAL EFFICACY GUIDANCE, supra note 56, at 3 (noting history of approvals on the basis of a single trial); Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115, § 115, 111 Stat. 2296, 2312 (1997)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)) (clarifying that FDA may rely on data from one adequate and well-controlled trial plus “confirmatory” evidence).
117. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. & NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, BEST (BIOMARKERS,
ENDPOINTS, AND OTHER TOOLS) RESOURCE 51 (Nov. 14, 2017).
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treatment, or prevention of disease.118 As a result, the trial protocol customarily specifies an endpoint that directly measures how the patient feels, functions,
or survives or an endpoint that represents or characterizes the clinical outcome
of interest, such as disease exacerbation or a clinical event like a stroke.119
Upon review of the resulting data, FDA approves the drug for a particular use,
and it approves the precise wording of the labeling that describes the conditions
of this use.120 The use, and this wording, in turn depend on the clinical trial
design, including the endpoints, as well as the statistical analysis of the resulting data. To give a concrete example, FDA does not approve a new drug for
Alzheimer’s disease in some general sense. Instead, it approved Exelon (rivastigmine tartrate) for “treatment of mild to moderate dementia of the Alzheimer’s type,” after Novartis provided the results from double-blinded, randomized, placebo-controlled trials in patients with mild to moderate dementia.121 The endpoint in those trials, in turn, was the drug’s ability to improve
cognitive performance, using parameters like concentration, memory, orientation (as to date, for instance), word recognition, and word finding.122 Clinical
trial design always shapes the scope of approval, meaning the wording that
describes the approved use and expected outcomes.
The customary clinical endpoint for a drug that treats a life-threatening
condition is overall survival.123 Investigators generally follow each research

118. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(g)(1) (West 2018) (defining a drug as, among other things,
an “article[] intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease”); 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(2) (2017) (requiring Indications and Usage section
of labeling to state that the drug is indicated “for the treatment, prevention, mitigation,
cure, or diagnosis of a recognized disease or condition, or of a manifestation of a recognized disease or condition, or for the relief of symptoms associated with a recognized
disease or condition”).
119. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS – DRUGS AND
BIOLOGICS 17 (May 2014) [hereinafter EXPEDITED PROGRAMS GUIDANCE] (defining
clinical endpoint as “a characteristic or variable that directly measures a therapeutic
effect of a drug – an effect on how a patient feels (e.g., symptom relief), functions (e.g.,
improved mobility), or survives”).
120. See supra Part II.D.
121. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NDA
20-823,
STATISTICAL
REVIEW(S)
(Nov.
30,
1997),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2000/20823_Exelon_statr_P1.pdf [hereinafter
EXELON EFFICACY]; Exelon Package Insert (2000).
122. Cognitive performance was measured using the cognitive subscale of the Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale (ADAS-cog) and overall clinical effect was assessed using a Clinician’s Interview Based Impression of Change with caregiver information (CIBIC-Plus). EXELON EFFICACY, supra note 121.
123. See TOM BRODY, CLINICAL TRIALS: STUDY DESIGN, ENDPOINTS AND
BIOMARKERS, DRUG SAFETY, AND FDA AND ICH GUIDELINES 191 (2012). Alternative
endpoints might be death itself or (depending on the drug and goal of the program) a
relevant clinical event such as recurrent heart attack or stroke.
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subject from randomization to the time that death occurs from any cause.124
The statistical analysis basically compares the survival times in the treatment
group with the survival times in the control group.125 One significant challenge
with overall survival analysis for drug sponsors is that it requires larger and
longer trials than other endpoints would.126 To begin with, if the disease has a
long course until death (prostate cancer, for instance, instead of pancreatic cancer), an overall survival analysis may require a longer period of follow-up with
subjects.127 Also, overall survival may require a larger sample size – more trial
subjects – to achieve statistical significance.128 This is particularly true if the
sponsor anticipates a small incremental increase in survival time, that is, a
small effect size.129 A larger sample size will, in turn, generally lengthen the
trial. This is because most phase 3 trials enroll subjects on a rolling basis.130
That is, subjects enroll one by one as they volunteer and are found to meet the
inclusion and exclusion criteria.131 Thus, a trial that requires more subjects to
achieve statistical significance with a selected endpoint can take longer to enroll and complete, and this can be exacerbated if disease prevalence or the
trial’s inclusion criteria limit the pool of potential volunteers in the first instance.

124. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: CLINICAL TRIAL ENDPOINTS FOR THE APPROVAL OF CANCER DRUGS
AND BIOLOGICS 5 (May 2007), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ucm071590.pdf [hereinafter CANCER ENDPOINTS GUIDANCE].
125. Id. at 6. As a practical matter, the protocol must specify a cut-off date for final
data analysis, with the understanding that some subjects may not have experienced
death yet. For these subjects, the data reflect minimum survival time rather than true
survival time. See Taane Clark et al., Survival Analysis Part I: Basic Concepts and
First Analyses, 89 BRIT. J. CANCER 89 (2003).
126. See CANCER ENDPOINTS GUIDANCE, supra note 124, at 4; BRODY, supra note
123, at 191.
127. BRODY, supra note 123, at 216; e.g., Carolyn Compton, Cancer Survival Analysis 28–29, in AJCC CANCER STAGING ATLAS (Carolyn Compton et al. eds., 2012) (“In
diseases with a long natural history, the duration of study could be 5–20 years, and
survival intervals of 6–12 months will provide a meaningful description of the survival
dynamics. If the population being studied has a very poor prognosis (e.g., patients with
carcinoma of the esophagus or pancreas) the total duration of study may be 2–3 years,
and the survival intervals may be described in terms of 1–3 months.”).
128. Ross L. Prentice, Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical Trials: Definition and Operational Criteria, 8 STAT. MED. 431 (1989).
129. Martin Abeloff, Biostatistics and Bioinformatics in Clinical Trials, in
ABELOFF’S CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 309, 311 (Martin D. Abeloff et al. eds., 4th ed. 2008)
(“A small study will have low power to detect small differences.”).
130. BRODY, supra note 123, at 122.
131. See id.
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2. Surrogate Endpoints
Use of a surrogate endpoint can shorten the duration of a trial, particularly
a trial that requires an overall survival analysis or another potentially distant
endpoint like death, heart attack, or stroke.132 A surrogate endpoint is a measurement used to predict a clinical benefit but does not establish a clinical effect
in itself.133 Surrogate endpoints include laboratory measurements (such as viral loads or counts of certain blood cell types) and measurements obtained
through MRI or other imaging technology.134 A surrogate endpoint can shorten
a trial’s duration because it can usually be measured earlier in time for each
subject in the trial.135 A trial with a surrogate endpoint generally also requires
fewer study subjects to achieve statistical significance, shortening the period
from the first patient’s first visit to the last patient’s last visit.136 A biostatistics
team from the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) illustrated both advantages
in 1989: an antihypertensive drug would require 25,000 subjects for five years
if the stroke endpoint were used, but the surrogate of maintenance of a blood
pressure drop permits a trial in 200 subjects for a year or two.137 Surrogate
endpoints thus have the potential to mitigate some of the problem faced by
companies considering development of drugs that would otherwise require
very long trials due to the clinical endpoints needed.
Surrogate endpoints can be further divided into validated surrogate endpoints and novel (not yet validated) surrogate endpoints.138 Validated surrogate endpoints are known to predict clinical benefit.139 Prior to validation, a
surrogate endpoint is merely thought to be predictive.140 There has been increased interest in use of novel surrogate endpoints since the early 1980s,141
132. Prentice, supra note 128, at 431 (“A primary motivation for the use of a surrogate endpoint . . . concerns the possible reduction in sample size or trial duration that
we can expect when a rare or distal endpoint is replaced by a more frequent or proximate endpoint.” (footnotes omitted)).
133. FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT, supra note 85, at R-9, R-11.
134. Abeloff, supra note 129.
135. Id. at 324; see also FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT, supra note 85, at R-11 (“In
disorders where the clinical endpoint is hard to assess (e.g., joint deterioration in rheumatoid arthritis) or takes a long time to occur (e.g., certain preventive therapies), use of
a qualified surrogate endpoint can markedly accelerate the development process for
treatment breakthroughs.”).
136. Prentice, supra note 128, at 431.
137. Janet Wittes et al., Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical Trials: Cardiovascular
Diseases, 8 STAT. MED. 415, 417 (1989).
138. Thomas R. Fleming & John H. Powers, Biomarkers and Surrogate Endpoints
in Clinical Trials, 31 STAT. MED. 2973, 2975 (2012).
139. Id.
140. See generally id.; see also Thomas R. Fleming & David L. DeMets, Surrogate
End Points in Clinical Trials: Are We Being Misled?, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 605
(1996).
141. FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT, supra note 85, at R-9, R-11.
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but there are also concerns. First, the disease of interest could affect the biomarker and the clinical endpoint separately, that is, on different biological
pathways.142 In this case, a change in the biomarker would not predict a change
in clinical outcome.143 The opposite could also be true: the treatment could
have no effect on the biomarker but a meaningful effect on the clinical outcome
of interest, in which case the clinical benefit would be missed.144 Second, the
disease process could achieve the clinical outcome, or increase the risk of the
clinical outcome, through multiple biological pathways, and the biomarker
might lie on only one pathway.145 In this case, too, a change in the biomarker
might not predict a change in clinical outcome.146 Confirmation of a particular
drug’s clinical benefit thus does not in itself validate – for other drugs – the
surrogate endpoint used in its initial approval.147 Third, the drug could have a
separate, not previously appreciated, mechanism of action that is independent
of its effect on the disease process and, perhaps, undesirable; this is sometimes
called an off-target effect.148
These concerns are not hypothetical. For instance, a difference in response rate without a difference in survival has been noted in both non-smallcell lung cancer and squamous cell carcinoma of the head and neck.149 In contrast, patients with colorectal cancer sometimes receive a meaningful survival
benefit without showing a comparably meaningful objective response.150 And
142. Thomas R. Fleming, Surrogate Endpoints and FDA’s Accelerated Approval
Process, 24 HEALTH AFF. 67, 69 (2005).
143. Id.
144. FDA, E9 GUIDANCE, supra note 58, at 9; Temple, supra note 33, at 1655 (noting possibility “that the presumed relation of a surrogate to a clinical end-point may not
exist”).
145. Fleming, supra note 142, at 69–70.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 71–72 (discussing how to validate and explaining that post-approval confirmation of clinical benefit does not necessarily validate the surrogate, and validation
for one pharmacologic class does not validate for all); cf. FDA, E9 GUIDANCE, supra
note 58, at 9 (noting that relationship between surrogate and clinical endpoints “for one
product do not necessarily apply to a product with a different mode of action for treating
the same disease”).
148. Fleming, supra note 142, at 70; Temple, supra note 33, at 1655 (noting possibility “that the surrogate end-point only measures what is thought to be the good effect
of a drug . . . but ignores potential adverse effects that may be rarer . . . but can undermine a beneficial effect”). Surrogate endpoints also present a statistical challenge; patients may fail to return for follow-up, leading to missing data. The overall survival
endpoint does not present this challenge, because vital status can always be determined.
Wittes et al., supra note 137, at 419.
149. Susan S. Ellenberg & J. Michael Hamilton, Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical
Trials: Cancer, 8 STAT. MED. 405, 408 (1989) (citing these and other studies in which
differences in tumor response did not correlate with differences in survival time).
150. See, e.g., Axel Grothey et al., Response-Independent Survival Benefit in Metastatic Colorectal Cancer: A Comparative Analysis of N9741 and AVF2107, 26 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 183, 183 (2008) (finding that objective response did not predict
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it was incorrectly assumed that reducing the incidence of ventricular premature
beats (surrogate endpoint) in patients after myocardial infarction would improve their survival (clinical endpoint).151 A three-year study of the antiarrhythmic drugs Enkaid (encainide) and Tambocor (flecainide) in nearly 2000
patients found the opposite; possibly due to an off-target effect, the drugs increased mortality.152
FDA has therefore been cautious with respect to novel surrogate endpoints. Although the agency initially approved some cancer drugs on the basis
of objective response, usually tumor shrinkage, by the mid-1980s it was expressing concern about the clinical relevance of these findings.153 The
agency’s hesitation pushed drug researchers towards the less risky approach of
studying overall survival.154 This led to a clash with the National Cancer Institute, the head of which complained that “having to do survival data” was
“another way of denying access” to cancer drugs.155 FDA yielded in March
1989, approving Paraplatin (carboplatin), a second generation platinum-based
chemotherapy agent, on the basis of objective response.156 The drug had been
developed as a replacement for Platinol (cisplatin), which was one of the most

the magnitude of survival benefit from the superior therapy and concluding that “tumor
response in metastatic colorectal cancer is not a necessary factor for a therapy to provide benefit to an individual patient”).
151. Temple, supra note 33, at 1655; Hampton, supra note 37, at 558.
152. The Cardiac Arrhythmia Suppression Trial (CAST) Investigators, Preliminary
Report: Effect of Encainide and Flecainide on Mortality in a Randomized Trial of Arrhythmia Suppression After Myocardial Infarction, 321 NEJM 406 (1989).
153. Richard Pazdur, Endpoints for Assessing Drug Activity in Clinical Trials, 13
ONCOLOGIST 19, 19–21 (2008) (noting that in the 1970s FDA used objective overall
response, i.e., tumor assessment, and then shifted to direct evidence of clinical benefit,
i.e., overall survival, health-related quality of life, tumor-related symptoms, and physical function). Dr. Pazdur was the director of FDA’s Division of Oncology Drug Products from 1999 to 2005 and the director of the Office of Hematology and Oncology
Products from 2005 to 2017; he is now director of FDA’s Oncology Center of Excellence.
154. See CARPENTER, supra note 30, at 574.
155. Id. at 574–75; see also Phase II Cancer Drug Clinical Trials Showing Antitumor Effect Should Be Sufficient Basis for Approval; National Cancer Institute’s
Bruce Chabner, PINK SHEET (Jan. 9, 1989) [hereinafter Phase II Cancer Drug Clinical
Trials] (noting “ongoing argument” between FDA and NCI over approval criteria for
anticancer agents, and quoting NCI Division of Cancer Treatment Director that a
“demonstration of partial or complete responses in a significant fraction, perhaps 20%,
of patients with stages or types of cancer refractory to standard therapy should be sufficient for approval”).
156. Paraplatin Package Insert (1990) (“In two randomized controlled trials in patients with advanced ovarian cancer previously treated with chemotherapy, Paraplatin
achieved six clinical complete responses in 47 patients. The duration of these responses
ranged from 45 to 71+ weeks.”); see also CARPENTER, supra, note 30, at 575.
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significant breakthroughs in cancer therapy, but was also highly toxic.157 Because Platinol was available, however, FDA would approve Paraplatin only as
a second-line treatment for advanced ovarian cancer, meaning for patients experiencing a relapse after treatment with another medicine.158 The agency
would not approve the drug for first-line treatment until July 1991, when Bristol-Myers Squibb had data from an overall survival endpoint and a time-toprogression endpoint.159 FDA then adopted regulations describing approval on
the basis of novel surrogate endpoints. These “subpart H” regulations permit
“accelerated” approval of a new drug for a serious or life-threatening condition
on the basis of a surrogate endpoint “reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit” or a clinical endpoint other than survival (also known as an “interim” or
“intermediate” endpoint).160 The applicant must study, verify, and describe the
clinical benefit after approval. Congress later codified accelerated approval.161
Despite the creation of an accelerated approval pathway, FDA remains
conservative. Medical reviewers as well as officials responsible for medical
policy continue to prefer two randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blinded
clinical trials, showing a statistically significant difference in measurement of
a clinical endpoint.162 From 2010 to 2014, less than a quarter of the drugs and
157. See Discovering Early Chemotherapy Drugs, INST. CANCER RES.,
https://www.icr.ac.uk/about-us/our-achievements/our-scientific-discoveries/we-discovered-chemotherapeutic-agents-which-are-still-in-use-more-than-50-years-later
(last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
158. Paraplatin Package Insert, supra note 156 (“Paraplatin is indicated for the palliative treatment of patients with ovarian carcinoma recurrent after prior chemotherapy,
including patients who have been previously treated with cisplatin.”); see also BristolMyers’ Paraplatin (Carboplatin) for Ovarian Cancer Recommended for Approval as
Second-Line Therapy in Relapsed Patients by FDA Advisory Committee, PINK SHEET
(Jan. 2, 1989). Dr. Temple explained in 1991 that because Platinol was known to improve survival, the agency’s advisors “felt that it was appropriate that the data be mature
enough to conclude that the use of carboplatin would not be associated with worse survival.” Bristol-Myers Squibb’s Paraplatin (Carboplatin) Data Support First-Line
Ovarian Cancer Indication Despite Survival Profile Concerns, FDA Finds, PINK SHEET
(July 8, 1991).
159. The revised labeling stated that Paraplatin had demonstrated an “equivalent
overall survival rate compared to cisplatin when both were given in combination with
cyclophosphamide.” Bristol-Myers Squibb’s Paraplatin (Carboplatin) Data Support
First-Line Ovarian Cancer Indication Despite Survival Profile Concerns, FDA Finds,
supra note 158.
160. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.500–314.560 (2017).
161. 21 U.S.C.A. § 356(c)(2)(A) (West 2018); 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d) (West 2018).
162. E.g., Joseph W. Cormier, Advancing FDA’s Regulatory Science Through
Weight of Evidence Evaluations, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2011); Miriam E. Tucker, FDA Panel Reviews Nitroglycerin for Anal Fissure: Opinion Was Divided on Whether Three Phase III Trials Demonstrated a “Clinically Meaningful” Effect, INTERNAL MED. NEWS (June 1, 2006), https://www.thefreelibrary.com/FDA+panel+reviews+nitroglycerin+for+anal+fissure%3a+opinion+was+di
vided...-a0147354087 (quoting Dr. Temple that substantial evidence generally requires
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biologics approved on the basis of surrogate endpoints (eighteen of the eightyfour) relied on novel surrogate endpoints.163 The rest used well-established
surrogates, like hemoglobin A1C for type 2 diabetes and bone marrow density
for osteoporosis.164 In the twenty-four years since FDA published its accelerated approval regulations, the agency has approved only nineteen non-cancer,
non-HIV drugs on the basis of a novel surrogate or interim endpoint.165

3. Scope of Approval
Use of a surrogate endpoint is meant to shorten time to market and should
have benefits in effective patent life. Paraplatin illustrates this. The shortened
clinical period for Paraplatin took just over three and a half years. At approval,
the drug had roughly seven years of effective life remaining on U.S. Patent No.
4,140,707, which became 9.5 years after patent term restoration. If the company had waited another twenty-four months for approval with overall survival
data, it would have had only five years of effective patent life left, which would
have become 8.5 years after patent term restoration.166 Thus, using a clinical
endpoint instead of a surrogate endpoint would have cost the company a year
of effective patent life, meaning a year of exclusive sales before generic market
entry.167 And it would have extended the premarket research and development
period, with no corresponding increase in the data exclusivity period after approval. This product, though, could have been labeled for first-line treatment.
Using the surrogate endpoint and accepting the more limited labeling was presumably the rational choice for Bristol-Myers. After all, it provided a revenue
stream from the second-line treatment during the clinical outcomes trial, and it
resulted in an additional year of effective patent life. It may also have been the
“at least one study showing a very large effect, or two studies for which the P value is
less than .05”).
163. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NOVEL
DRUGS APPROVED USING SURROGATE ENDPOINTS (2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/Testimony/UCM445375.pdf [hereinafter NOVEL DRUGS].
164. Id. None of the ninety-one new molecular entities approved for treatment of
rare diseases between 2009 and 2014 were approved on the basis of a novel surrogate
endpoint. Emil D. Kakkis et al., Accessing the Accelerated Approval Pathway for Rare
Disease Therapeutics, 34 NATURE BIOTECH. 380, 380 (2016).
165. Frank J. Sasinowski & Alexander J. Varond, FDA’s Flexibility in Subpart H
Approvals: Assessing Quantum of Effectiveness Evidence, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 135,
139 (2016).
166. 35 U.S.C.A. § 156(c)(2) (West 2018). Two more years in trials would have
cost it two years of effective patent life, but only one of those years would have been
recoverable. Id.
167. Once approved, generic drugs will capture most of the market. Henry
Grabowski et al., Recent Trends in Brand-Name and Generic Drug Competition, 17 J.
MED. ECON. 207, 212 (2013) (finding that the average new molecular entities experiencing initial generic entry in 2011 and 2012 retained only sixteen percent of the market
after one year). The revenue from an additional year of exclusivity before this generic
penetration will vary with the product.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/6

32

Lietzan: Drug Innovation Paradox

2018]

THE DRUG INNOVATION PARADOX

71

socially desirable outcome because it made a less toxic alternative to Platinol
available sooner to physicians and patients.
The surrogate endpoint is not, however, simply a shorter pathway to market. This is because FDA does not approve active ingredients alone. It approves a finished product, its intended use, and the words that describe that use.
When the agency approves a product on the basis of a surrogate endpoint, the
product generally receives a limited indication. Physicians and patients receive
access to a prepared medicine containing the new active ingredient, and they
may well have an inkling – or even a very good idea – of the hoped-for full
indication. But the new product that has been approved is, from a regulatory
perspective, a different product. Physicians will not have full instructions for
the unapproved use, the company will be circumscribed in its ability to discuss
what it knows about the unapproved use, and insurers may not cover the drug
for unapproved use. Thus although the company may commercialize during
this portion of the patent term, much of the regulatory impediment to fully exploiting the patent remains in place.168 The narrow indication for Paraplatin
put the drug in the middle of a debate about off-label prescribing, reimbursement for unapproved uses, and promotion of unapproved uses.169
The innovation paradox is that longer research programs lead to lesser
rewards for innovation. In cases like Paraplatin, the paradox may be acceptable. In theory, the company had two choices with respect to its product: a surrogate endpoint and limited indication early, or a clinical endpoint and full indication later. We may want to steer companies facing this type of choice towards use of the surrogate endpoint, although if this is desirable because we
assume oncologists will use the product for first-line treatment anyway, requiring the survival endpoint for the first-line labeling is something of a sham.
In some cases, however, the choice between a surrogate and clinical endpoint is not available, and here the innovation paradox may be unacceptable.
Sometimes a firm may have only the choice to proceed through a long track,
on the one hand, or abandon the compound for another, on the other hand. This
is true even in oncology; the availability of a surrogate or interim endpoint
depends largely on the type of cancer, the drug’s mechanism of action, and the

168. This is why suggestions that companies adopt premarket strategies with longer
timelines in order to position the resulting product more competitively in the marketplace do not ring true. See Harold E. Glass et al., Are Phase 3 Clinical Trials Really
Becoming More Complex?, 49 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 852, 857 (2015)
(hypothesizing that increase in per-patient duration in clinical trials results in part from
wanting to make comparative efficacy or cost-effectiveness claims). The history of
new drug approvals is replete with examples of products approved on the basis of narrow indications, only to be expanded later to more competitively beneficial labeling as
more robust data became available. This is true not only of drugs subject to accelerated
approval, for instance, but also products like Jardiance, discussed infra note 201.
169. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFF-LABEL DRUGS: REIMBURSEMENT
POLICIES CONSTRAIN PHYSICIANS IN THEIR CHOICE OF CANCER THERAPIES 32–33 (Sept.
1991), https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/151121.pdf.
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availability of other treatments – considerations outside the sponsor’s control.170 As to type of cancer: as noted objective response rate does not always
predict overall survival in metastatic colon cancer.171 Meta-analyses suggest
progression-free survival correlates moderately well with overall survival in
metastatic colon cancer,172 though not in prostate cancer.173 As to mechanism
of action: whether a drug is cytotoxic (kills cancer cells) or cytostatic (slows or
stops the growth of cancer cells, without killing them) can affect whether objective response accurately predicts overall survival.174 To give another example, immunotherapy drugs for cancer work by stimulating the immune system
and do not directly affect tumors, and they sometimes prompt a mild flare (apparent tumor growth) that is not actual disease progression.175 In these cases,
short-term objective response would be misleading. As to other treatments:
just as the availability of Platinol meant that FDA expected overall survival
data for Paraplatin, where there is no available therapy for the cancer and major
tumor changes can be presumed due to the tested drug, FDA is open to objective response and possibly proceeding without a control.176
In short, in some cases there may be no alternative to the overall survival
endpoint. For non-metastatic cancers, this may require a long follow-up period
that triggers an intolerable innovation paradox, meaning that we will have to
do without treatment. For example, as one physician from Sloan-Kettering
commented at a recent meeting convened at FDA’s behest at Duke’s Margolis
Center for Health Policy, “[W]e are not going to have new drugs approved for
myeloma if we don’t get [minimal residual disease] as an endpoint.”177
So, too, with drugs to treat neurodegenerative disorders. If a disease is
characterized by progressive degradation of the nervous system over an extended period of time, proving that a drug modifies the disease or meaningfully
changes its ultimate outcome may require an unacceptably long clinical trial –
170. When FDA accepted a surrogate endpoint for Paraplatin, it told the National
Cancer Institute that endpoint decisions would be made on a tumor-by-tumor basis.
Phase II Cancer Drug Clinical Trials, supra note 155; see also CARPENTER, supra note
30, at 576–77; see generally BRODY, supra note 123, at 197–263 (exploring advantages
and disadvantages of differing oncology endpoints based on the disease and other considerations); CANCER ENDPOINTS GUIDANCE, supra note 124, at 4–5 (table comparing
options).
171. See generally Grothey et al., supra note 150.
172. Chiara Cremolini et al., Surrogate Endpoints in Second-Line Trials of Targeted Agents in Metastatic Colorectal Cancer: A Literature-Based Systematic Review
and Meta-Analysis, 49 CANCER RES. TREATMENT 834, 841 (2017).
173. Beth Sherrill et al., Review of Meta-Analyses Evaluating Surrogate Endpoints
for Overall Survival in Oncology, 5 ONCOTARGETS & THERAPY 287, 292 (2012).
174. BRODY, supra note 123, at 210–11.
175. Sue Sutter, Cancer Immunotherapies Have FDA, Industry Looking for New
Endpoints, PINK SHEET (Oct. 19, 2016).
176. CANCER ENDPOINTS GUIDANCE, supra note 124, at 3. Historical controls are
another possibility. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(v) (2017).
177. Sue Sutter, Cancer Trial Endpoints: Minimal Residual Disease Eyed as Surrogate, PINK SHEET (Sept. 20, 2016).
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particularly if the drug must be administered decades before death might be
expected. In the therapeutic category of central nervous system drugs there are
very few surrogate endpoints to shorten the pathway and lead to a different
scope of approval. The innovation paradox may simply steer innovators to
other drugs.
Alzheimer’s disease provides a cautionary tale. To date, FDA has approved only treatments for relief of the clinical symptoms.178 Additional treatments might someday delay the onset of dementia or even modify the disease’s
natural course by affecting its underlying pathophysiology.179 But new drugs
for Alzheimer’s fail repeatedly in clinical trials.180 One study found a 99.6%
failure rate in trials performed between 2002 and 2012.181 We still do not understand the causes of this disease, its genetic and molecular pathways, or why
and how it progresses.182 There are no measurable biological characteristics
(biomarkers) that diagnose the disease, predict or measure its progression, or
identify successful drug targets.183 The amyloid hypothesis – that the neurodegeneration in Alzheimer’s disease is caused primarily by the deposit of amyloid beta plaques in brain tissue – is nearly twenty-five years old,184 but amyloid beta plaques have not proven to be a reliable biomarker. In trial after trial,
drugs that reduce these plaques have had no measurable clinical impact.185 The
tau hypothesis holds that neurofibrillary tangles in the brain, mainly composed

178. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
TARGETED DRUG DEVELOPMENT: WHY ARE MANY DISEASES LAGGING BEHIND? 6 (July
2015),
https://www.fdanews.com/ext/resources/files/07-15/7-15-FDAReport.pdf?1519911049 [hereinafter TARGETED DRUG DEVELOPMENT].
179. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY, ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE: DEVELOPING DRUGS FOR THE TREATMENT OF
EARLY STAGE DISEASE 5 (Feb. 2013), https://isctm.org/public_access/FDAGuidance_AD_Developing_Drugs_Early_Stage_Treatment.pdf [hereinafter ALZHEIMER’S
GUIDANCE].
180. See Erin McCallister, Diagnosing AD Trials: Why Diagnostics Are Key to the
Development of AD Drugs, BIOCENTURY (Mar. 3, 2017, 8:31 PM), https://www.biocentury.com/biocentury/product-development/2017-03-03/why-diagnostics-are-key-development-ad-drugs.
181. Jeffrey L. Cummings et al., Alzheimer’s Disease Drug-Development Pipeline:
Few Candidates, Frequent Failures, 6 ALZHEIMER’S RES. & THERAPY 37, 41 (2014).
182. TARGETED DRUG DEVELOPMENT, supra note 178, at 4.
183. Id. Rare genetic forms of the disease are the exception. Id.
184. See, e.g., John A. Hardy & Gerald A. Higgins, Alzheimer’s Disease: The Amyloid Cascade Hypothesis, 256 SCIENCE 184 (1992).
185. Cummings et al., supra note 181, at 43; see Nicholas Kozauer & Russell Katz,
Regulatory Innovation and Drug Development for Early-State Alzheimer’s Disease,
368 NEJM 1169, 1169–70 (2013); TARGETED DRUG DEVELOPMENT, supra note 178, at
4; McCallister, supra note 180.
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of the protein tau, are the primary causative factor, but the first anti-tau drug to
reach phase 3 also failed to show any improvement in cognition.186
One possibility is that treatments need to intervene earlier in the natural
history of the disease.187 The problem is that Alzheimer’s disease progresses
slowly, and showing delayed onset of dementia would require a time-to-event
endpoint, comparable to oncology’s survival analysis.188 So the question becomes whether surrogate endpoints are available. There are no validated surrogates, leaving only the possibility of novel surrogates and limited labeling.
In the preclinical stages of Alzheimer’s disease, although functional impairment has not begun, there are subtle cognitive deficits.189 It is also possible to
measure subtle cognitive improvements. Moreover, these improvements are
viewed as reasonably likely to predict delayed onset of dementia.190 As a result
FDA will permit accelerated approval using improved cognitive benefit as a
novel (not validated) surrogate marker for delayed onset of dementia, which
will then be evaluated after approval.191 But there is no pathway for accelerated
approval of a drug to modify the course of the disease itself.192 There is no
reliable evidence that any biomarker is reasonably likely to predict a lasting
effect on the disease course. So accelerated approval is not an option.193
If indeed trials for Alzheimer’s treatments need to begin early in the natural history of the disease, during the preclinical stages, the conundrum is
clear.194 The paradoxical patent term and the flat exclusivity term may discourage companies from investing in these treatments rather than in drugs for
short-term use that can be studied quickly or drug classes and diseases with
validated surrogate endpoints.
186. See Andrew Pollack, Alzheimer’s Drug LMTX Falters in Final Stage of Trials,
N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/business/alzheimers-drug-lmtx-trial.html?_r=0.
187. Kozauer & Katz, supra note 185, at 1169–70 (noting a “leading theory” that
“attempts at intervention [are occurring] too late in the progression of disease”). The
authors are medical officers in FDA’s Division of Neurology Products.
188. ALZHEIMER’S GUIDANCE, supra note 179, at 2 (“The underlying anatomical
and pathophysiologic changes in AD begin many years before clinical symptoms
emerge.”); id. at 4 (“The use of a time-to-event survival analysis approach (e.g., time
to a diagnosis of dementia) is a particularly appealing primary efficacy measure in clinical trials in early AD. For practical reasons, trials designed with this endpoint have
been generally conducted in the stages of the illness nearest to the onset of dementia . .
. .”).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 5.
193. Id.; TARGETED DRUG DEVELOPMENT, supra note 178, at 4.
194. Another possibility, of course, is that we misunderstand the disease mechanism altogether. See McCallister, supra note 180 (noting that researchers are also considering neuroinflammation, vascular pathology, loss of protein homeostasis, and mitochondrial dysfunction and noting the “lack of biomarkers for therapies with targets
outside of amyloid and tau aggregation pathways”).
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B. Safety Testing Requirements
In recent years, concerns about long-term drug safety have led to an increase in premarket safety testing requirements for certain classes of drugs.
Hostile congressional oversight and perennial funding problems (which leave
the agency at the legislature’s mercy) have always motivated agency officials
to avoid approval of drugs that turn out, with broader and uncontrolled clinical
use, particularly long-term use, to have an unfavorable balance of risk and benefit.195 A series of high profile drug withdrawals in the 1990s and early 2000s
may have made avoiding these errors more salient.196 Although additional
safety testing may reduce Type I errors, the concern from an innovation policy
perspective is that it also delays the approval of drugs that turn out to have
acceptable risk-benefit balances. The new requirements affect certain types of
drugs – those intended for long-term use – more than others. For instance, after
emerging long-term data suggested an elevated risk of heart attacks in patients
treated with Avandia (rosiglitazone maleate) for type 2 diabetes, FDA decided
that all sponsors of new diabetes treatments should conduct cardiovascular outcomes safety trials, even if no safety signal emerged in preclinical or clinical
testing.197 The requirement has now spread to new obesity drugs and may
195. Anna B. Laakmann, Collapsing the Distinction Between Experimentation and
Treatment in the Regulation of New Drugs, 62 ALA. L. REV. 305, 320 (2011) (noting
tendency to avoid “type 1” errors, meaning false positives, or approvals that should not
have happened); Louis Lasagna, Congress, the FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After 1962, 32 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 322, 335 (1989) (noting that FDA is
usually hauled before Congress for drug safety problems and not for failure to approve
products).
196. See Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Cost of New
Drug Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 417, 419 (2004)
(suggesting that a decline in submitted NDAs was attributable to increased testing requirements following recalls in the 1990s). The drugs in question were Redux (dexfenfluramine), Pondimin (fenfluramine), Posicor (mibefradil), and Duract (bromfenac)
in 1997, followed by Rezulin (troglitazone) in 2000, and Vioxx (rofecoxib) in 2004 and
Bextra (valdecoxib) in 2005. The safety issues varied. For instance, fenfluramine was
associated with cardiac valvulopathy, while bromfenac was hepatotoxic. See generally
Ruowei Li et al., Dose-Effect of Fenfluramine Use on the Severity of Valvular Heart
Disease Among Fen-phen Patients with Valvulopathy, 23 INT’L J. OBESITY 926 (1999);
Robert J. Fontana et al., Acute Liver Failure Associated with Prolonged Use of Bromfenac Leading to Liver Transplantation, 5 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION & SURGERY 480
(1999).
197. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DIABETES
MELLITUS – EVALUATING CARDIOVASCULAR RISK IN NEW ANTIDIABETIC THERAPIES TO
TREAT TYPE 2 DIABETES 3–4 (Dec. 2008), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ucm071627.pdf; Kate Rawson & Michael McCaughan, CV
Outcomes Trials in Diabetes: First Results Suggest “Goalpost” Model Here to Stay,
PINK SHEET (May 11, 2015) (noting connection to Avandia); Mervyn Turner, Embracing Change: A Pharmaceutical Industry Guide to the 21st Century, in TRANSLATIONAL
MEDICINE AND DRUG DISCOVERY 328, 329 (Bruce H. Littman & Rajesh Krishna eds.,
2011) (discussing requirement).
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spread further.198 To give another example, FDA recently asked the sponsor
of a new antibiotic, solithromycin, to conduct a 9000-patient liver safety study
prior to approval.199 Whether the obligation to conduct long-term premarket
safety studies will affect particular therapeutic categories or pharmacologic
classes more than others remains to be seen.
These new requirements will protect premarket timelines. The primary
goal in a cardiovascular outcomes safety trial, for instance, is to demonstrate
no increased risk of cardiovascular events. By design the trials are often “event
driven” – meaning that the design requires waiting until a pre-specified number
of specific cardiovascular events (such as death, myocardial infarction, or
stroke) have occurred. As a result, these trials can be larger and longer than
other trials in the premarket clinical program – up to seven years in length, for
instance, or involving as many as 16,000 patients.200 It may be possible to
obtain approval while such a trial is ongoing, once sufficient interim data have
accrued for a cardiovascular safety meta-analysis.201 But the additional testing
198. Cathy Dombrowski, CV Risk Assessment for All Obesity Drugs Seems Inevitable Pre-approval Requirement, PINK SHEET (Mar. 29, 2012); Donna Young, US FDA
Panel Calls for Additional CV Studies for Weight-Loss Drugs, PINK SHEET (Mar. 30,
2012); Michael McCaughan, The Inevitable Outcome: Diabetes Safety Model Expands
to Weight Loss . . . and Beyond?, PINK SHEET (May 1, 2012).
199. Michael Cipriano, Cempra’s Solithera Draws FDA Complete Response Letter
on Liver Risks, PINK SHEET (Dec. 29, 2016).
200. Boaz Hirshberg & Arie Katz, Cardiovascular Outcome Studies with Novel Antidiabetes Agents: Scientific and Operational Considerations, 36 DIABETES CARE
S253, S254 (2013).
201. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., NDA 204629, CROSS DISCIPLINE TEAM LEADER REVIEW (July 31, 2014),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2014/204629Orig1s000CrossR.pdf (noting that clinical review of
Jardiance (empagliflozin) presents cardiovascular safety analysis separately from main
review, due to inclusion of interim data from ongoing trial and need to protect trial
integrity by maintaining confidentiality); CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NDA 204629, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND
BIOPHARMACEUTICS REVIEW(S) (July 18, 2014), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2014/204629Orig1s000ClinPharmR.pdf (omitting pages 166–179 in
the public version). Such a trial could also support a claim of superiority with respect
to cardiovascular outcomes. These studies use a non-inferiority design, intended to
show that the new drug is not materially worse than the control. A non-inferiority study
that shows superiority to the active control can support a claim of superiority without
statistical adjustment. Cf. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: NON-INFERIORITY CLINICAL TRIALS TO ESTABLISH
EFFECTIVENESS 18 (Nov. 2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/UCM202140.pdf; see also Sue Sutter, Can a Safety Study Support a Superiority
Claim? Barely, US FDA Advisors Say, PINK SHEET (July 4, 2016) (describing FDA’s
recommendation to increase enrollment rather than conduct a second study of Jardiance
to support superiority claim and describing the protocol changes needed); Michael
McCaughan, Diabetes Outcomes Trial Requirement Looks ‘Increasingly Wise’ –
FDA’s Temple, PINK SHEET (Sept. 1, 2016) (noting Dr. Temple’s view that the trial
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has delayed approval, and each year of this testing costs half a year of effective
patent life. In short, certain therapeutic categories associated with long-term
use of medicines are now associated with a safety testing burden that could
lengthen their time to market – with a direct cost in effective patent life – relative to other therapeutic categories.

C. Continuing Evolution in the Paradigm
In recent years, as we have gained a better understanding of the molecular
basis of pathological disease processes and the body’s response to drugs, the
basic approach to drug discovery has evolved.202 Some hope this shift will
reduce the number of failed drugs (the attrition rate) and shorten research and
development timelines for successful drugs.
The traditional approach was phenotypic, working from observable results. It involved screening new compounds in animals to determine their pharmacological effects and then, on the basis of inference from the animal models,
planning and conducting a clinical program for a human drug.203 The new approach involves selection of a biological target – based on a greater understanding of disease pathways, enzymes that play important roles in those pathways,
and cell surface receptors that bind to molecules and change cell behavior –
and screening chemical libraries for compounds that affect the target in question.204 The new approach results in a larger group of candidate compounds
and requires a strategy for sorting out the most promising from the others.205
Typically, this means clinical pharmacology work: a small human trial to prove
the compound’s mechanism of action, meaning its effect on the biological target of interest, not its effect on any particular disease or condition.206 Proof of
mechanism is followed by clinical studies to determine whether the proof of
mechanism translates to clinical effectiveness, meaning its ability to accomplish a particular outcome with respect to a particular disease or condition.207

reported “decreased CV mortality” and a reduction in “serious heart failure” which are
“potential claims that are novel for the class”).
202. Editorial, Looking Back on the Millennium in Medicine, 342 NEJM 42, 48
(2000) (noting that “major advances in drug therapy could not occur until there was
sufficient understanding of physiology and pathophysiology to permit rational identification of targets for drugs”).
203. Bruce H. Littman, Translational Medicine: Definition, History, and Strategies, in TRANSLATIONAL MEDICINE AND DRUG DISCOVERY, supra note 197, at 3, 3.
204. Id. at 4–6; see also ERLAND STEVENS, MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY: THE MODERN
DRUG DISCOVERY PROCESS 15, 95–100 (2014).
205. Littman, supra note 203, at 4.
206. Id. at 7–13.
207. Id.
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This is “translational” medicine, and it differs fundamentally from the experimental approach of screening compounds in animals.208 Translational
medicine is viewed as having an enormous upside. It will work from biological
theory rather than trial and error; it is multidisciplinary, leveraging the expertise of statisticians, laboratory medicine, engineers, and programmers; and it
should push promising compounds into clinical testing earlier. FDA has embraced translational medicine, for example by issuing guidance that accommodates the earlier shift to human testing.209 The agency will accept a smaller and
simpler submission – an “exploratory IND” – supporting what many call the
“phase 0” trial.210 This trial typically involves administration of a micro-dose,
or a dose expected to have pharmacologic but not toxic effects, to a very small
number of individuals.211 Because the study size is small and the dose low, the
preclinical safety package to support an exploratory IND can be smaller than
the preclinical package required to support a conventional IND – perhaps five
or six studies performed over three to six months, instead of the usual nine to
twelve studies that take as long as eighteen months.212 Moreover, the clinical
program should itself be shorter. If compounds are correctly identified on the
basis of biological theory, they could have a more significant effect on the disease in question, which could make it possible to show effectiveness with
smaller and shorter phase 3 trials.213 Thus, the thinking goes, translational
medicine will reduce the number of failed drugs and shorten premarket timelines.
This potential has not yet been realized. The overall attrition rate for new
drugs remains high – “horrendously high” according to NIH Director Francis

208. FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT, supra note 85, at ii; see generally Francis S.
Collins, Reengineering Translational Science: The Time is Right, 3 SCI.
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1 (2011) (describing the process of translational medicine).
209. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, INVESTIGATORS, AND REVIEWERS: EXPLORATORY IND
STUDIES (Jan. 2006), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm078933.pdf [hereinafter EXPLORATORY IND
GUIDANCE]; see also OFFICE OF TRANSLATIONAL SCI., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDES, VOLUME I – ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS 1–2 (Dec.
10, 2012), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffManualGuides/UCM348370.pdf (describing creation of Office of Translational Sciences and explaining its responsibilities); Collins, supra note 208, at 1 (announcing
establishment of a new National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences, at the
National Institutes of Health).
210. See Collins, supra note 208, at 3.
211. Id. at 1; see also DAVID J ACOBSON-KRAM , OVERVIEW OF THE EXPLORATORY
IND: DIFFERENCES FROM THE TRADITIONAL IND 7–8 (Oct. 4, 2007), http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/92B1B2A5B6A14D8496B3FF315DF50763.ashx.
212. See EXPLORATORY IND GUIDANCE, supra note 209, at 4; JACOBSON-KRAM,
supra note 211, at 14.
213. Abeloff, supra note 129.
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Collins – and may be increasing.214 Recent estimates place the phase 2 failure
rate at sixty-five to seventy percent and even higher for drugs with new mechanisms of action.215 Some research suggests the attrition stems mostly from
lack of effectiveness, which may follow naturally from bringing a larger number of candidate compounds into human trials in the first instance, with less
certainty about their ultimate clinical potential.216 In translation medicine, an

214. Collins, supra note 208, at 1; see also Bruce H. Littman, Preface to
TRANSLATIONAL MEDICINE AND DRUG DISCOVERY, xix, xix (calling the attrition rate
“unsustainable”); FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT, supra note 85, at R-4 (stating that a
“new compound entering human trials in 2000 was no more likely to reach the market
than one entering human testing in 1985”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NEW
DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 25 (Nov. 2006),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0749.pdf (noting that clinical trial failure rates increased from eighty-two percent during the period 1996 through 1999 to ninety-one
percent during the period 2000 through 2003); Ismail Kola & John Landis, Opinion,
Can the Pharmaceutical Industry Reduce Attrition Rates?, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG
DISCOVERY 711, 712 (2004) (noting the declining success rates of phase 3 trials from
the 1990s to 2000s); Turner, supra note 197, at 330 (stating that translational medicine
does not seem to increase success rates in phase 2 or phase 3).
215. Littman, supra note 203, at 21; see also David C. Swinney & Jason Anthony,
How Were New Medicines Discovered?, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 507, 507
(2011) (examining seventy-five first-in-class drugs with new molecular mechanisms of
action approved between 1999 and 2008, finding that substantially more resulted from
phenotypic screening than from target-based approach, and postulating that a targetcentric approach “may contribute to the current high attrition rates and low productivity” in drug research and development); JACOBSON-KRAM, supra note 211, at 14–15.
216. Littman, supra note 203, at 21 (noting two studies that attributed failures to
lack of effectiveness); Turner, supra note 197, at 330 (less certainty about their “properties and clinical potential”). The high failure rate could also stem from (1) the fact
that the easy solutions to chronic diseases of aging have already been found, leaving
the more difficult solutions to these diseases for now, and (2) the fact that researchers
are now focusing on diseases that are simply harder to solve; progressive diseases of
the central nervous system are one notorious example. See id. at 329 (arguing that after
Hatch-Waxman, industry “entered a period of declining productivity, driven in large
part by its own success in innovating therapies with clear-cut etiologies and treatment
paradigms that essentially made differentiated new drugs more difficult to discover and
develop”); see also Joseph Cook et al., The Future Costs, Risks, and Rewards of Drug
Development: The Economics of Pharmacogenomics, 27 PHARMACOECON. 355, 360
(2009) (noting possibility that “past research has already addressed those medical needs
most easily solved, causing the number of compounds that might need to be studied to
resolve an unmet medical need to increase”). One recent empirical study, which examined a large international database containing information on research and development
of more than 28,000 compounds since 1990, found that companies are increasingly
focusing on more difficult targets characterized by high failure rates and that this “reorienting” of investment accounted for most of the recent decline in productivity in
research. Fabio Pammolli et al., The Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical R&D, 10
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 428, 436 (2011).
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entire drug development program can crumble if the biological target is misunderstood. For instance, the biological target might turn out to be merely
associated with the disease or with disease progression, rather than lying in the
disease’s causal pathway.217 Or the disease may turn out to have redundant
pathways; modulating the biological target may simply shut off one pathway,
causing the body to compensate by enhancing disease progression through another pathway.218 Unexpected safety problems may also account for a substantial amount of attrition.219 In the end, we are still profoundly limited in our
ability to predict, before phase 2 and 3 trials, whether modulating any particular
biological target will achieve a desirable clinical outcome and whether it will
have acceptable side effects.220 The translational approach is limited by our
lack of scientific capacity to predict the full spectrum of clinical effects that
will result from modulating a particular biological target.
Industry has been slow to embrace the exploratory IND. Although the
reasons for this are unclear, going into early human testing with less information about any ultimate clinical potential has important implications for the
length of the post-market reward period. Proof of mechanism testing in humans – the initial phase 0 trial that screens a large number of compounds at
micro-doses in very small numbers of human subjects – does not start a development project down the traditional runway to regulatory approval the way a
phase 1 trial did in 1984. At this stage in translational drug development, researchers may have little idea of the nature of any eventual medicine that might
be proposed at the end of the process. There may be a substantial gap before
phase 2 trials occur and an even more substantial gap before trials to assess a
clinical endpoint. Moreover, although the proof of mechanism testing might
screen a large number of compounds, a company generally selects only one or
a few for phase 2 and only one for the full clinical program. If the company
217. TARGETED DRUG DEVELOPMENT, supra note 178, at 2 (“[B]iochemical targets
and biomarkers that appear to be linked to the disease progression often fail because,
while associated with the disease, they are not directly in the causal pathway . . . .”);
Jack W. Scannell et al., Diagnosing the Decline in Pharmaceutical R&D Efficiency, 11
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 191, 195 (2012) (noting that “if the causal link between single targets and disease states is weaker than commonly thought, or if drugs
rarely act on a single target, one can understand why the molecules that have been delivered by this research strategy into clinical development may not necessarily be more
likely to succeed than those in earlier periods” (footnotes omitted)).
218. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 204, at 20.
219. Business decisions may account for the remainder of the attrition. John Arrowsmith, A Decade of Change, 11 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 17, 17 (2012)
(“The weakest link in the chain was, and still is, in Phase II, where around 50% of
failures are typically due to efficacy, 30% are due to strategic reasons and 20% are due
to safety concerns.” (footnote omitted)).
220. PCAST REPORT, supra note 12, at 17–18 (noting that our current success rate
is “around 9 percent” and that our “greatest need is for improved methods for target
validation”); FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT, supra note 85, at R-10 (arguing that academia, industry, and agency need to develop better predictive tools to screen candidates
in the first instance).
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must return to the drawing board because translation fails, it might select a
runner-up compound, but this could be some time after the exploratory screening in humans. And yet, conventional wisdom still generally counsels that a
patent application should be filed before clinical testing starts. If the preclinical
period is shorter, this may mean the patent application is filed earlier in time
(relative to market launch) and the effective patent life shorter, unless the clinical period (from phase 0 testing to NDA submission) is itself the same or
shorter.
The high failure rate is therefore concerning. When a biological target
and compound are generally understood but several rounds of clinical trials are
required to optimize the compound’s therapeutic potential, the clock is ticking
on the active ingredient patent. One agency scientist noted in 2007 that the
perception that exploratory INDs protract the clinical timeline may be one reason industry has not fully embraced them.221 Perhaps not surprisingly there is
renewed interest in the phenotypic approach to drug development.222
Continuing evolution in clinical trial and statistical methodologies also
have the potential to shorten phase 3 trials in the years ahead.223 One possibility is enrichment strategies, which use patient characteristics to select a study
221. J ACOBSON-KRAM, supra note 211, at 22.
222. See generally Wei Zheng et al., Phenotypic Screens as a Renewed Approach

for Drug Discovery, 18 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 1067 (2013) (arguing that use of cellbased phenotypic assays to screen compound libraries could lead to a new era of drug
discovery); Bridget K. Wagner, The Resurgence of Phenotypic Screening in Drug Discovery and Development, 11 EXPERT OPINION DRUG ON DISCOVERY 121, 124 (2016)
(arguing that “[i]n the interest of saving costs from late-stage clinical failures, it would
seem attractive for the pharmaceutical industry to take phenotypic approaches more
frequently during screening campaigns”); see also Michael Leviten, The Phenomics
Phenomenon: Why Phenotypic Screens are Making a Comeback, BIOCENTURY (Mar.
23, 2017, 6:51 PM), https://www.biocentury.com/bc-innovations/tools-techniques/2017-03-23/why-phenotypic-screens-are-making-comeback (suggesting renewed interest in phenotypic approach “after several analyses published on the origins
of new medicines surprisingly showed that most came from phenotypic studies rather
than the target driven approaches dominating the industry”). Thanks to improved cellbased models of disease, better imaging techniques, and improved computation capabilities, the new phenotypic approach may be more efficient than the phenotypic
screens of the 1980s. Id.
223. In addition to the enrichment strategies and adaptive design discussed in text,
a shift from frequentist to Bayesian statistical methods may permit smaller trials and
thereby shorten phase 3 timelines. PCAST REPORT, supra note 12, at 21 (noting that
Bayesian design may allow smaller trials). Increased use of Bayesian methods has been
anticipated for some time. See generally Edmund A. Gehan, Biostatistics in the New
Millennium: A Consulting Statistician’s Perspective, 9 STAT. METHODS MED. RES. 3
(2000) (predicting a shift from frequentist statistical analysis to Bayesian methods, or
empirical Bayesian methods); Robert Temple, How FDA Currently Makes Decisions
on Clinical Studies, 2 CLINICAL TRIALS 276, 276, 278–80 (describing several drug approvals where the agency had departed from frequentist analysis and used “some of the
thinking processes that are involved in Bayesian approaches”); see also FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PDUFA REAUTHORIZATION
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population in which detection of drug effect is more likely (or the effect more
significant or noticeable).224 As a statistical matter, this allows a smaller and
shorter trial.225 To give a concrete example: Genentech used genetic information to prescreen breast cancer patients for trials of the biological medicine
Herceptin (trastuzumab), which cut the trial from ten years to 1.6 years.
Screening permitted enrollment of 470 patients who were expected to have a
fifty percent response rate. To get the same number of positive responses without the genetic screen, Genentech would have needed to enroll 2200 patients
with a ten percent response rate.226 Another possibility is adaptive trial design.
This innovation responds to the fact that post hoc subgroup analyses of large
datasets often suggest that a trial limited to that subgroup would have been
successful. FDA uniformly rejects post hoc subgroup analyses, however, and
starting over protracts the timeline. An adaptive trial design pre-specifies subgroups of interest and plans protocol changes on the basis of accumulating
data.227 Whether the sponsor uses enrichment or adaptive trial design, however, the resulting approved new drug is labeled narrowly for the particular
stratified patient subset. The sponsor, healthcare professionals, insurers, and
patients thus face the same trade-offs as in the Paraplatin example.

V. PREMARKET RESEARCH FROM 1984 TO 2016
The innovation paradox is that the post-market reward is flat or decreases
if a company spends more time in premarket research and development. It is
true of patents regardless of field of technology, and it should generally skew
PERFORMANCE GOALS AND PROCEDURES FISCAL YEARS 2018 THROUGH 2022, at 31,
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/UCM511438.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2018) (committing to facilitating the use of “complex adaptive, Bayesian, and other novel clinical trial designs”).
224. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: ENRICHMENT STRATEGIES FOR CLINICAL TRIALS TO SUPPORT
APPROVAL OF HUMAN DRUGS AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 2 (Dec. 2012),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm332181.pdf [hereinafter ENRICHMENT STRATEGIES].
225. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PAVING THE
WAY FOR PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 54 (Oct. 2013), https://dx.advamed.org/sites/dx.advamed.org/files/resource/fda_report_on_paving_the_way_for_personalized_medicine.pdf [hereinafter PAVING THE WAY] (stratifying a disease “can dramatically shorten overall drug development and review times”);
see generally ENRICHMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 224.
226. Cook et al., supra note 216, at 357.
227. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: ADAPTIVE DESIGN CLINICAL TRIALS FOR DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 7–14
(Feb. 2010), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM201790.pdf; see Anup Malani et al., Accounting for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in the FDA Approval Process, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 23,
25 (2012); see also Deepak L. Bhatt & Cyrus Mehta, Adaptive Designs for Clinical
Trials, 375 NEJM 65 (2016) (offering four case studies).
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firms to projects with shorter time to market or to decisions within a project
that shorten the time to market. The concern is that in the field of medicine the
impact is different – that due to the theory of our new drug approval system,
the paradox will skew choices away from particular development programs and
therefore types of medicine. The impact of the paradox may, however, be unknowable. FDA approves roughly as many new molecular entities per year as
it ever did, but we have no way of knowing the drugs that would have been
developed and approved had the incentive structure been different.
Parts II and IV of this Article suggest some hypotheses, however, that are
relevant to understanding the paradox: (1) the preclinical research period has
been getting shorter; (2) the clinical period has increased in length, at least for
some types of product; (3) there is variability in the length of the clinical testing
period by therapeutic category and perhaps also within therapeutic categories;
(4) surrogate endpoints can shorten the clinical testing period; and (5) certain
types of product will generally require a longer research and development period. Products that generally require a longer research and development period
should be those intended for long-term use to prevent, delay, or mitigate a laterin-life clinical event (except where a validated surrogate endpoint is available)
and those intended to modify the natural history of a progressive or degenerative disease. Because FDA publishes information about the length of the clinical testing period in connection with applications for patent term restoration,
it is possible to describe these points empirically.

A. Dataset and Methodology
The dataset used in this section relates to 570 distinct regulatory review
periods – clinical testing followed by FDA review of a new drug application –
each of which resulted in approval of a product with a new active ingredient,
meaning an active ingredient not previously approved for use in humans. 228
The dataset of 570 regulatory review periods was generated as follows.
228. Sometimes a single premarket program leads to more than one application.
The analysis in this subsection focuses on distinct regulatory review periods rather than
distinct applications. For instance, Parke-Davis and Warner Lambert collaborated with
Sankyo in the development of troglitazone for treatment of type II diabetes. The companies submitted companion NDAs for Rezulin and Prelay, which were approved on
the same day with identical labeling (apart from the brand name and manufacturer
name). There was only one regulatory review period, and PTO restored only one patent, which protected both products. See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF PATENT TERM UNDER 35 USC 156 FOR U.S.
PATENT 4,572,912 (Feb. 27, 1997). The regulatory review period was counted once in
the analysis. In another instance, PTO restored two patents in connection with the same
regulatory review period. Application 21,446 for Lyrica (pregabalin) covered treatment of neuropathic pain associated with diabetic neuropathy, and application 21,723
covered treatment of post-herpetic neuralgia. According to FDA, the Lyrica application was “administratively split” by indication because the review divisions and timelines were different. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG
ADMIN.,
APPROVAL
PACKAGE
FOR
NDA
21-446,
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First, PTO provided a spreadsheet of all patent term restoration applications received between September 28, 1984, and September 30, 2016. PTO
also maintains a table of patent term restoration grants on its website.229 Neither is complete, and the lists were therefore combined and the duplicates deleted.230 Second, the approved new drugs were pulled for analysis. Section
156 authorizes patent term restoration for other regulated products, such as
food additives and medical devices. These were excluded.231 Third, only approved new drugs for which FDA had published a regulatory review period on
or before October 1, 2016, comprised the final dataset. The agency does this
if it concludes that the NDA in question resulted in the first commercial marketing of the active ingredient, that is, if it concludes that the active ingredient
was new.232
At the end of this process, the dataset contained 570 distinct regulatory
review periods. This comprises every NDA for a new active ingredient as to
which FDA had calculated a regulatory review period by October 1, 2016. This
Part refers to these as 570 new drugs, NDAs, or products; each corresponds to
a distinct regulatory review period associated with a distinct and new active
ingredient and usually only one NDA.233 In five cases, however, the applicant

ADMINISTRATIVE/CORRESPONDENCE REVIEWS (July 28, 2004) (Office Director’s SignOff Memorandum); Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. U.S.A., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 643, 656
(D. Del. 2012) (explaining that because FDA approved two Lyrica applications on the
same day, PTO agreed that two patents were entitled to restoration). The regulatory
review period was counted only once in the analysis.
229. Patent Terms Extended Under 35 U.S.C. § 156, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/patent-term-extension/patentterms-extended-under-35-usc-156 (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).
230. For instance, the spreadsheet omitted – but the table included – Atrovent
(ipratrop ium). The table omitted – but the spreadsheet included – more than fifty new
drugs with restored patents, including Savella (milnacipran hydrochloride), Potiga
(ezogabine), and Myfortic (mycophenolic acid). It is impossible to rule out the possibility that some patent term restoration applications were omitted from both documents,
but no other regulatory review periods were published in the Federal Register.
231. This was done by categorizing the products on the basis of regulatory provisions – new drug approval, biological product licensure, medical device approval or
clearance, new animal drug approval, or food additive petition – applied by FDA.
232. FDA calculated one regulatory review period and later concluded that the
product did not contain a new active ingredient. The drug is Adsol, used for collection
and storage of blood and blood components. It was excluded from the dataset because
the dataset was defined as all approved new active ingredient drugs for which FDA had
published a regulatory review period by October 1, 2016, when data collection closed.
233. Although FDA has calculated 570 regulatory review periods, these did not all
result in patent term restoration. One request – Bextra (valdecoxib) – was ultimately
denied because the request had not been timely filed, and another – Zemuron (rocuronium bromide) – received no actual restoration because the applicant already had
fourteen years of effective life on the patent proposed for restoration. Also, there were
thirty-four calculated regulatory review periods for which the patent term restoration
request was still pending on October 1, 2016.
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performed its clinical testing in another country.234 These applicants therefore
never filed INDs; they proceeded straight to NDAs. The problem is that section
156 defines the testing period, for purposes of patent term restoration, as beginning on the date the IND took effect. As a result, for these five NDAs, FDA
calculated the testing period as zero days. This does not mean, however, that
the drugs spent zero days in clinical trials; it simply means the patent term
restoration notices do not provide data for analysis. These five drugs are omitted from the analysis that follows.

B. Preclinical Testing Period
The shift to translational medicine should, in theory, put promising compounds into human trials earlier, truncating the preclinical testing period. The
dataset does not provide reliable information about the date that the applicant,
or any other company, started testing the molecule in the laboratory. For the
length of the preclinical research period, therefore, the analysis uses an imperfect proxy: the time from the earliest filing of a patent application to the time
that the clinical testing period began. The patents reviewed in each case were
the patents listed by the NDA holder in the Orange Book, as well as the restored
patent, if it was not listed.235 The Orange Book lists any patent claiming the
drug or an approved method of using the drug and should generally include the
initial active ingredient patent, if there was one.236 Because the goal was to
identify the earliest possible point in time when preclinical work might have
been underway, the earliest available date was used.237 The effective date of
the IND, published by FDA in the Federal Register, served as the end of the
preclinical period.
Fourteen drugs were excluded from the preclinical analysis. These drugs
were never associated with any listed patents, even though the drugs were eligible for patent listing. For these drugs, the only patent in the dataset is the
patent proposed for restoration. The statute required these firms to list any
patent claiming the drug itself,238 so the lack of any listed patents means the
234. These are Xyzal (levocetirizine dihydrochloride), DaTscan (ioflupane I-123),
Coartem (artemether; lumefantrine), Promit (dextran 1), and Lac-Hydrin (ammonium
lactate).
235. The Orange Book is in its 37th edition. See APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS, supra note 90. The information in the current print edition also appears in an electronic
database on the FDA website, but neither lists expired patents. Id. To determine the
patents listed for each NDA in the dataset, all prior annual print editions of the Orange
Book were reviewed.
236. See id. (section titled “Patent and Exclusivity Lists”).
237. This was the earliest of the actual filing date of the application to hand, the
filing dates of any related U.S. applications, the priority date of any foreign patent application cited by the patentee, and any Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”) filing date.
The goal was to identify a reasonable proxy for the earliest point in time that the applicant might have been doing preclinical work.
238. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b)(1) (West 2018).
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restored patent was not an active ingredient patent. These drugs were therefore
omitted from analysis of the preclinical period.
After excluding the fourteen drugs without patent listings and the five
drugs tested overseas, the remaining 551 new active ingredient drugs had an
average preclinical period of 5.61 years (median 4.8, standard deviation 4.13).
To examine a possible time trend in the length of the preclinical testing period,
the 551 drugs were sorted by the patent filing date, which had served as a proxy
for the start of preclinical research. The earliest patent filing date was September 5, 1964, and the latest was May 13, 2005. The patent filing dates were
arranged in three-year increments.

Years

Figure 1. Average Time from Earliest
Patent Filing to Start of Clinical Trials
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Although Figure 1 shows a downward trend line, caution is warranted.
There is a potential for selection bias at both ends.
First, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments did not take effect until September 1984, and the earliest approved drug in the dataset received FDA approval
in August 1984. Thus, if a drug that started preclinical testing in the 1960s
appears in the dataset at all, the overall premarket program (preclinical plus
clinical testing) took a long time. Other drugs from those years that completed
testing more quickly will not appear in the dataset. The information for these
years may be skewed to indicate a longer than warranted average preclinical
period. Second, the opposite may be true for the final time intervals. If a drug
that started preclinical testing in the late 1990s or early 2000s appears in the
dataset, its overall premarket program may have been unusually short. Other
drugs that started preclinical testing at the same time may yet be unapproved.
Thus the information for the final time intervals may be skewed to suggest a
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shorter than warranted average preclinical period. If one excludes the intervals
before 1973 and after 1993, there is still a downward trend but it is less stark.
The inclusion of antibiotics could have skewed the trend line, but if anything it should have reduced the downward slope. Prior to 1997, new antibiotic
drugs were not subject to the patent listing or exclusivity provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”),239 and the pre-1997 antibiotics
were not themselves subject to patent listing requirements until 2008.240 The
dataset includes thirty-two antibiotic drugs that were not subject to patent listing prior to 2008. For these drugs, the analysis considered the patent proposed
for restoration and any patents listed after 2008. In any case where this approach overlooked an already expired active ingredient patent, the actual start
of preclinical work could have been much earlier than assumed by using the
proxy. In this case, the preclinical period would be longer than reflected in
Figure 1. Because the lack of patent listings affects only antibiotics approved
by FDA before 1997, however, any distortion would raise the averages at the
beginning of the time sequence and should not change the fact that the preclinical period trends downward over time, although it might change the slope.
Assuming the downward trend line is correct, there is more than one possible explanation. First, it may mean that the preclinical testing period has
been getting shorter. This is consistent with the shift to the translational approach to drug discovery, which puts compounds into patients faster. Interpreting the trend line to mean shorter preclinical testing periods is also consistent with the fact that industry investment in the preclinical phase has been
declining for several decades.241 Second, it may reflect a change in the timing
239. Antibiotic drugs reached the market under section 507 of the FDCA rather
than section 505 of the FDCA prior to November 1, 1997. 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1993)
(repealed 1997). The Hatch-Waxman scheme did not apply to them. In addition to
twenty-nine antibiotic drugs, FDA approved two cancer treatments under section 507
and one drug intended for prophylaxis of organ rejection: DaunoXome (daunorubicin
citrate) approved in 1996 as a first-line cytotoxic therapy for treatment of Kaposi’s
sarcoma; Idamycin (idarubicin hydrochloride), approved in 1990 for treatment of acute
myeloid leukemia; and Cellcept (mycophenolate mofetil), approved in 1995 for
prophylaxis of organ rejection. See DONALD O. BEERS & KURT R. KARST, GENERIC
AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS § 4.02(I) (8th
ed. 2016) (discussing FDA’s use of section 507 for cancer drugs). Congress repealed
section 507 in 1997 and enacted a new and unrelated section 507 in 2016. Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115, § 125 (1997)
(repealing section 507); 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114–255 § 3011, 103 Stat.
1033, 1086 (2016) (adding a new section 507).
240. Q1 Program Supplemental Funding Act of 2008, Pub L. No. 110–379, § 4(b),
122 Stat. 4075 (2008) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355); Draft Guidance for Industry
on the Submission of Patent Information for Certain Old Antibiotics, 73 Fed. Reg.
73,659 (Dec. 3, 2008).
241. Fredric J. Cohen, Opinion, Macro Trends in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 4
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 78, 81 (2005) (noting that since 1976, the industry
has allocated “relatively more” resources to clinical and regulatory work and relatively
less to preclinical work).
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of patent filings. That is, sponsors may be applying for their initial patents later
in the preclinical research process, for instance due to changes in patent law.242
This dataset does not provide a basis for determining whether shorter preclinical periods, later patent filings, or both are responsible.
There is also a lag inherent in the dataset. Any trend in the length of
preclinical testing periods or in the timing of patent filings since the early to
middle 2000s is not reflected here.

C. Clinical Testing Period
1. Average Clinical Testing Period
The 570 products in this database – minus the five studied overseas – have
an average clinical testing period of 2177 days, or 5.96 years (median 1910
days, standard deviation 1200 days). The shortest testing period in the dataset,
198 days, belongs to Geref (sermorelin acetate), an endocrine/metabolic agent
approved in 1990 for the treatment of idiopathic growth hormone deficiency in
children with growth failure. The longest testing period – 9569 days, or 26.22
years – belongs to Ampyra (dalfampridine), a potassium channel blocker approved in 2010 to improve walking in patients with multiple sclerosis.
The story of Ampyra’s discovery and development illustrates some of the
challenges of modern drug development.243 Although multiple sclerosis is still
not fully understood, it involves the immune system attacking myelin, which
surrounds and insulates the nerve fibers, as well as the fibers themselves. The
story begins with 4-aminopyridine (or 4-AP), a potassium channel blocker and
potent nervous system toxicant used as a bird poison in the United States in the
early 1970s.244 Studies in insects, mollusks, and other animals in the 1970s
and 1980s explored the impact of 4-aminopyridine on nerve fibers and suggested it could help electrical impulses travel across demyelinated nerves. 245
Establishing in animal studies that a chemical can help electrical impulses
242. For instance, beginning in 1995 patent terms were calculated from the date of
patent application rather than from the data of patent issuance. See supra note 93. This
might have prompted later patent filings in industries subject to premarket regulatory
review. Changes in patent doctrine due to significant judicial decisions could also affect patenting practices.
243. See generally Lisa Emrich, FDA Approves Ampyra (Dalfampridine), Previously Known as Ampriva (Fampridine-SR), Amaya (Fampridine-SR), and 4-Aminopyridine or 4-AP, BRASS & IVORY (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.brassandivory.org/2010/01/fda-approves-ampyra-dalfampridine.html.
244. U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, Reregistration Eligibility Decision for 4-Aminopyridine 7 (Sept. 27, 2007), https://archive.epa.gov/pesticides/reregistration/web/pdf/aminopyridine_red.pdf (noting initial pesticide registration in 1972).
245. See generally, e.g., R. M. Sherratt et al., Effects of 4-Aminopyridine on Normal
and Demyelinated Mammalian Nerve Fibres, 283 NATURE 570 (1980); J. I. Gillespie
& O. F. Hutter, The Actions of 4-Aminopyridine on the Delayed Potassium Current in
Skeletal Muscle Fibres, 252 J. PHYSIOLOGY 70P (1975).
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travel through nerves is, however, a far cry from knowing the best way that
chemical can be deployed to benefit human patients. The proof of a useful
biological activity in animals is just the beginning.
Academic and commercial researchers explored possible ways this compound could be best developed for patients, considering not only multiple sclerosis but spinal cord injuries and Guillain-Barre syndrome.246 Early clinical
trials involved only a few patients and were essentially phase 0 studies designed for proof of principle. A trial in 1983 examined the effect of 4-aminopyridine on visual function in ten patients with multiple sclerosis.247 Another
trial in 1986 examined vision, oculomotor function, and motor function in
twelve patients.248 The first U.S. trial in humans was on February 10, 1983,
and is the reason FDA calculated 9569 days for the testing period; because it
occurred in the United States, this trial required an effective IND.249 When the
IND took effect, the pharmaceutical company that would eventually develop a
sustained release formulation that delivered stable blood levels of the drug and
that would establish this product’s safety and effectiveness for the improvement of walking ability in patients with multiple sclerosis did not even exist.
In 1990, Elan Corporation acquired the rights to 4-aminopyridine from
the Rush Multiple Sclerosis Center in Chicago and began developing a product,
which it intended to call Neurelan.250 Elan conducted larger trials examining
the effect of the drug – then assigned the generic name “fampridine” and later
changed to “dalfampridine” – on a wide variety of neurophysiological measurements.251 Clinical testing indicated that fampridine has a narrow therapeutic
index, specifically a risk of seizure when at peak concentration in the blood.

246. See Sherratt et al., supra note 245.
247. Richard E. Jones et al., Effects of 4-Aminopyridine in Patients with Multiple

Sclerosis, 60 J. NEUROLOGY SCI. 353 (1983).
248. Dusan Stefoski et al., 4-Aminopyridine Improves Clinical Signs in Multiple
Sclerosis, 21 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 71 (1987).
249. Determination of Regulatory Review Period for Purposes of Patent Extension;
AMPYRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 12,974, 12,974 (Mar. 9, 2011). The substance had been administered intravenously to a few people outside the United States in the 1970s. E.g.,
H. Lundh et al., Effects of 4-Aminopyridine in Myasthenia Gravis, 42 J. NEUROLOGY,
NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 171, 171 (1979) (assessing effect in six patients).
250. See Elan Adds U.S. Marketing Presence Through Athena Neurosciences Merger; Athena Alzheimer’s Research Will Be More Independent, Biotech Firm Says, PINK
SHEET (Mar. 25, 1996).
251. E.g., Christopher T. Bever, Jr., et al., Preliminary Trial of 3,4-Diaminopyridine in Patients with Multiple Sclerosis, 27 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 421 (1990); see
also Christopher T. Bever, Jr., et al., The Effects of 4-Aminopyridine in Multiple Sclerosis Patients: Results of a Randomized Placebo-Controlled, Double-Blind, Concentration-Controlled, Crossover Trial, 44 J. NEUROLOGY 1054 (1994); Christopher T.
Bever, Jr., The Current Status of Studies of Aminopyridines in Patients with Multiple
Sclerosis, 36 ANNALS NEUROLOGY S118 (1994).
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This led Elan to develop a safer sustained-release formulation, known as fampridine-SR.252 In 1994 and 1996, Elan obtained patents for the sustained release technology associated with fampridine-SR, including U.S. Patent No.
5,540,938, which Acorda would license from Elan and for which the company
would eventually seek restoration.
Acorda was founded in 1995 to develop treatments for spinal injuries and
other central nervous system disorders. The two companies formed a joint
venture in 1997, with Elan contributing rights to the sustained release formulation and Acorda conducting clinical trials.253 The run-up to FDA approval of
Ampyra began in earnest in November 2000, with a double-blind, placebocontrolled, dose-ranging study of fampridine-SR intended to settle on tolerable
doses for a sustained release product.254 This was seventeen years after the
earliest administration of fampridine to humans in the United States. The company suffered a setback when the phase 3 program for treatment of spinal cord
injury failed; both studies missed their primary endpoints, one in late 2003 and
the other in early 2004.255
The multiple sclerosis development program had been proceeding in parallel but was slightly behind; Acorda met with the agency to discuss the results
of the phase 2 testing in the summer of 2004.256 Clinical trial design for the
phase 3 multiple sclerosis trials was a significant hurdle, in part because the
endpoint was unprecedented.257 Those trials began in December 2005 and August 2007, and during phase 3 the company and agency met more than once to
discuss study results and trial design.258 FDA and Acorda met again in October
2008 to discuss the NDA and Acorda submitted the application the following
April – twelve years after acquiring the rights to fampridine-SR.
The Ampyra story illustrates several points about new drug research and
development. First, early research may occur with very little vision of a finished product. The initial work occurred after the basic mechanism of multiple
sclerosis (demyelination) was understood. Researchers then considered the
252. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
NDA 22250, CROSS DISCIPLINE TEAM LEADER REVIEW 2 (Jan. 20, 2010),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2010/022250s000_CrossR.pdf
[hereinafter FDA MEMO].
253. Elan Meltdown May End R&D Joint Ventures as Funding Vehicle for Biotech,
PINK SHEET (Feb. 11, 2002). The companies later entered a licensing agreement. Id.
254. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NDA
22250, MEDICAL REVIEW(S) 18 (Dec. 10, 2009), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2010/022250s000_MedR.pdf [hereinafter AMPYRA CLINICAL
REVIEW].
255. FDA MEMO, supra note 252, at 3.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 10; see also Mary Jo Laffler, The Long Road to Approval: Acorda
Experience with Ampyra Shows Success of Novel Analysis Plan, PINK SHEET (Dec. 1,
2010).
258. See AMPYRA CLINICAL REVIEW, supra note 254, at 20; FDA MEMO, supra note
252, at 4.
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possibility that a compound with neurotoxic effects in animals would disrupt
the effect of demyelination on nerve conductivity. This required very early
testing in humans, long before any thought could be given to a potential product
and before any thought could be given to an eventual clinical indication (i.e.,
visual acuity versus gait versus coordination, or – as it turned out – walking
speed). Indeed the disease in which this promising compound could be most
effectively deployed had not been determined.
Second, a product that fails to meet a particular endpoint in one disease
or condition could succeed with a different endpoint in that disease or condition
or, as in this case, a different disease or condition. Failure in a particular phase
3 program may have very little to do with the therapeutic potential of the invention or its value to society. Yet resource constraints may mean that a firm
will not start the second phase 3 program until the first phase 3 program fails,
which in turn has clear negative consequences for effective patent life.
Third, a commercial firm that acquires the rights to a molecule after basic
research has been done may not gain a meaningful head start on account of the
research. Phase 1 involved brief clinical pharmacology trials. The bulk of the
work remained: phase 2, with its high attrition rates, and phase 3 (in this case,
two rounds of phase 3), with its full-blown efficacy endpoints. In situations
where the active ingredient patent application is filed before clinical testing,
this company stands very little chance of having meaningful patent protection
for the new product that it brings to market. The patent claiming the sustained
release formulation and its use had only three and a half years of patent life left
by the time Ampyra was approved. With restoration, it had eight and a half
years of effective life.
Although the length of the clinical testing period of Ampyra seems striking, Fulyzaq (crofelemer), intended for treatment of diarrhea in patients with
HIV taking anti-retroviral therapy, had a 20.2-year testing period. Strattera
(atomoxetine hydrochloride), intended for treatment of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), spent twenty years in trials. Two antibiotic drugs
– Orbactiv (oritavancin) and Cubicin (daptomycin) – spent 17.2 years and 16.9
years, respectively, in clinical testing. It is tempting to suggest that these experiences were not classic or conventional new drug research and development
programs – that some were programs abandoned and restarted, and others characterized by serendipity and accident. But the point is that this seems to happen
with some frequency. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of clinical testing
period lengths; fifty-nine drugs in the dataset had clinical testing periods exceeding ten years, and 161 drugs (more than one in four) had clinical programs
exceeding seven years. Thirteen of the 161 have patent term restoration requests still pending at the USPTO, but the remaining 148 had an average effective patent life after patent term restoration of 10.4 years.
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To be sure, these findings suggest that companies continue to develop
products that will have spent a very long time in development by the time they
are approved. This invites the question whether the structural problem really
harms innovation. But even if some companies continue to invest in drugs with
longer premarket programs, we do not know how many others choose not to,
or how many new drugs that require long-term research we would have if the
incentive structure were different. We do know that several large companies
have withdrawn from the neuroscience field citing the longer development
time.259 We also know that firms underinvest in the development of cancer
drugs that require long-term trials.260 Further, we do not know why companies
pursue long-term premarket programs. It is possible that in some cases the
length of the clinical program was not apparent at the outset, leading to a sunk
cost effect.261 It is possible that in some cases firms have reasons other than
259. See Abbott, supra note 11 at 161–62.
260. See Budish et al., supra note 10, at 2047.
261. The sunk cost effect – also known as “escalation of commitment” or, more

colloquially, “throwing good money after bad” – characterizes behavior in which a firm
continues to invest in a decision or process despite increasingly negative outcomes,
rather than changing its course. E.g., Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A
Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORG. BEHAVIOR &
HUMAN PERFORMANCE 27 (1976); see also Sunk Cost Fallacy: Throwing Good Money
After Bad, STRATEGIC THINKING & STRATEGIC ACTION (Mar. 21, 2015), http://leepublish.typepad.com/strategicthinking/2015/03/sunk-cost-fallacy.html. Lilly’s continued
investment in solenezumab might be an example of this. After the drug – which had
been in clinical testing since 2004 – failed in two phase 3 trials that examined its impact
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patent or data exclusivity to expect a long period of marketing exclusivity (or
near-exclusivity) or (even in situations where the marketing exclusivity period
is short) adequate post-approval reward. For example, a drug might be unusually difficult to manufacture, which could provide some assurance of near-exclusivity in itself. A drug to be taken daily for a chronic condition might generate more revenue during its marketing exclusivity period than a drug that will
be administered as a single course of treatment lasting ten days.

2. Average Clinical Testing Period over Time
a. By First-in-Human Date
The drugs in the dataset were sorted by the year their INDs went into
effect, permitting testing in humans, to examine a trend in the clinical period
over time. Data for the first five years and the last five years were dropped
because of their potential for selection bias, as follows. First, the earliest IND
in the dataset took effect in 1970. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments did not
take effect until September 1984, which means the earliest approved drug in
the dataset received FDA approval in August 1984. Thus every drug in the
dataset with a clinical trial start in the early 1970s necessarily took a long time
in trials. Put another way, any drugs that started trials in those years and took
less time would have been approved before 1984 and would not appear in the
dataset. Because the dataset inherently omits some drugs that started trials in
the early 1970s, the information for those years is incomplete and systematically skewed to suggest a higher average testing period. Second, precisely the
opposite is true for the clinical trials starting in the late 2000s. The latest IND
in the dataset took effect in 2009. The latest approved drugs in the dataset
received approval in early 2014. Thus every drug in the dataset that started
trials in the late 2000s necessarily had a short clinical testing period – or it
would not be in the dataset. Put another way, the drugs that started trials in
those years and took more time, or are still taking more time, would not appear
in the dataset yet. Because the dataset inherently omits some drugs that started
testing in the late 2000s, the information for those years is incomplete and systematically skewed to suggest a shorter average testing period.
on cognitive and functional impairment in mild and moderate Alzheimer’s, the company realized that participants with mild Alzheimer’s fared better than controls in the
cognitive portion of the testing. Still blind to the data from its ongoing third trial, it
shifted the data analysis plan to improvement of cognitive functioning in mild Alzheimer’s. See Emily Underwood, Why the Big Change to Lilly’s Alzheimer’s Trial Is
Not Evidence Its Drug Has Failed Again, SCIENCE (Mar. 21, 2016, 1:30 PM),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/why-big-change-lilly-s-alzheimer-s-trialnot-evidence-its-drug-has-failed-again; Damian Garde, A Big Alzheimer’s Drug Trial
Now Wrapping Up Could Offer Real Hope – or Crush It, STAT (Oct. 13, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/2016/10/13/alzheimers-drug-eli-lilly/. This third phase 3
trial was also a failure. Jessica Merrill, Lilly’s Solanezumab Fails, but the Surprise
Would Have Been Success, PINK SHEET (Nov. 23, 2016).
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Length of Program in Years

Figure 3. Average Length of Clinical
Program
by Year Clinical Testing Started
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Continuing selection bias could explain the high averages at the beginning of the period in Figure 3 and the apparent downward trend line at the end
of the period.262 Excluding five years at either end, rather than some other
number of years, was arbitrary. If continuing selection bias is treated as likely,
Figure 3 generally suggests that a company starting clinical trials in 2004 was
not, on average, facing a meaningfully longer clinical program than a company
starting clinical trials in 1984. Whether this remains true today is not known;
the inherent lag in any dataset based on approved drugs with published Federal
Register notices relating to patent term restoration requests means that the data
do not reflect any changes that might be expected by a sponsor starting phase
1 work in 2010 or later.
b. By End-of-Phase 3 Date
Part IV explained that the design of a phase 3 trial to establish a drug’s
effectiveness for its proposed use – including the trial’s endpoints, size, and
duration – reflects many factors, including the drug’s mechanism of action, its

262. The data from 1975 (average clinical period of 9.03 years) and 1976 (average
clinical period of 8.0 years) may be biased because any drug that started trials in those
years and had a moderately short clinical trial experience would have been approved
before 1984 and would be missing from the dataset. The data from 2003 (average of
5.66 years) and 2004 (average of 5.43 years) could be biased for precisely the opposite
reason; given the range of clinical program lengths in the broader dataset, some drugs
that started trials in those years might not have reached FDA approval and patent term
restoration in time for inclusion in the dataset.
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physiological effect in the body, the disease under investigation, the hypothesized outcome, and possibly other products on the market. Because several
phases of clinical testing precede phase 3, sorting the drugs by the start of testing in humans (commencement of phase 1 testing) risks obscuring trends in the
length of the clinical program caused primarily by evolution in phase 3 design
over time.
Trends in the length of the clinical program caused primarily by evolution
in phase 3 design could be captured better by sorting the drugs by the year that
phase 3 trials began. The dataset does not provide a basis for doing so, however, and the date that phase 3 trials started is not publicly available for every
drug in the database. The drugs in the dataset were sorted instead by the year
that the sponsor submitted its NDA. This provides a rough proxy for the timing
of the phase 3 program because NDA submission generally occurs within a
year of the completion of the final phase 3 trial.263

Length of Program in Years

Figure 4. Average Length of Clinical
Program
by Year NDA Submitted
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Figure 4 illustrates an upward trend in the length of clinical testing periods based on a proxy for the date when phase 3 trials ended. The length of
clinical programs increases over time when drugs are sorted by NDA submission date even though it does not increase over time when the drugs are sorted
by IND effective date. Considering Figure 3 and Figure 4 together, therefore,
suggests that the length of the clinical program correlates at least in part with
263. E.g., Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Application for Food and Drug Administration Approval to Market a
New Drug, 79 Fed. Reg. 16,003, 16,006 (Mar. 24, 2014) (estimating that it takes a new
drug sponsor 1921 hours to prepare and submit a new drug application).
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the date of NDA submission. Because NDA submission generally follows
within a year of phase 3 completion, this further suggests that the length of the
clinical program correlates at least in part with the date that phase 3 trials
ended. Without information on the phase 3 start date, it is impossible to determine whether the trend line reflects an increase in the length of phase 3 trials
alone. But some studies have found that phase 3 trials are increasing in
length.264

D. Surrogate Endpoints
Analysis of the impact of surrogate endpoints on the length of clinical
programs is challenging because FDA has approved drugs on the basis of surrogate endpoints for nearly all of its history, and there is no reliable comprehensive list of these approvals. Well before the subpart H regulations took
effect in 1993, for example, FDA approved osteoporosis drugs on the basis of
total body calcium and bone mineral content, when the clinical outcome of
interest was reduction in bone fractures.265 Antihypertensives have always
been approved on the basis of a surrogate endpoint. The clinical outcome of
interest is reduction in cardiovascular events including cardiovascular mortality, but these drugs have always been tested for reduction of blood pressure and
264. The consulting firm KMR Group examined 4100 oncology trials conducted
over a ten-year span by thirty-two companies and, relying on proprietary data from
those companies, found that phase 3 trials increased from an average of 3.5 years (for
trials started between 2003 and 2005) to an average of five years (for trials started between 2013 and 2015). KMR GROUP, 2015 CLINICAL CYCLE TIME TRENDS: SELECT
FINDINGS FROM KMR GROUP’S ANNUAL CLINICAL DATA PROGRAM (2015) (on file with
author); Why Are Oncology Clinical Trials Taking Longer?, CLINICAL TRIALS ARENA
(Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.clinicaltrialsarena.com/news/operations/why-are-oncology-clinical-trials-taking-longer-4698649. On the basis of entries in the NIH clinical
trials databank, Glass found a thirty percent increase in the per-patient duration of phase
3 trials from 2008 to 2013 and a forty-one percent increase in per-patient duration of
oncology trials over the same time period. Glass et al., supra note 168, at 856. Using
a proprietary database, Getz analyzed 10,038 protocols for phase 2 and 3 trials of drugs
to treat chronic illness and found that between 1999 and 2005 the period from first
patient first visit to last patient last visit increased by fifty-three percent. KENNETH
GETZ, PROTOCOL DESIGN TRENDS AND THEIR EFFECT ON CLINICAL TRIAL
PERFORMANCE
315–16
(May
2008),
http://csdd.tufts.edu/_documents/www/2816Getz.pdf.
265. E.g., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH DRUGS AND THE DRUG SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 42–44, 141 (Mar. 5, 2013), https://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20170404145949/https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/ReproductiveHealthDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM351018.pdf (discussing approval of postmenopausal osteoporosis
indication for Calcimar (synthetic calcitonin salmon) in 1984, on the basis of total body
calcium assessed by neutron activation analysis and bone mineral content measured by
single photon absorptiometry of the forearm).
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were originally labeled only for reduction of blood pressure.266 The only way
to definitively categorize the basis of approval of the 570 drugs in the dataset
would be to examine FDA’s review documents.267 There are, however, publicly available lists of the accelerated approvals under subpart H on the basis
of novel (not validated) surrogate endpoints.268 Certain comparisons of interest
can therefore be made.
First, drugs approved on the basis of novel surrogate endpoints under subpart H can be compared with drugs approved under the conventional approval
regulations after subpart H took effect. The latter include drugs approved on
the basis of clinical endpoints and drugs approved on the basis of validated
surrogate endpoints. Table 1 reports the results. There were 413 drugs in the
dataset approved after January 11, 1993, the effective date of the subpart H
regulations. Of these, three were tested overseas, leaving 410 with clinical
testing information in the dataset. Of these, thirty-four received accelerated
approval under subpart H, and 376 had traditional approval. Table 1 indicates
that the thirty-four drugs approved on the basis of novel surrogate endpoints
had an average clinical program of 5.61 years (median 5.08, standard deviation
2.41), while the traditionally based approvals had an average clinical program
of 6.28 years (median 5.42, standard deviation 3.43). Drugs in the dataset approved on the basis of novel surrogate endpoints after January 11, 1993, spent
an average of 247 fewer days, around eight fewer months, in clinical testing
than drugs approved on the basis of traditional clinical endpoints or validated
surrogate endpoints.

266. Mehul Desai et al., Antihypertensive Drug Development: A Regulatory Perspective, in HYPERTENSION: A COMPANION TO BRAUNWALD’S HEART DISEASE 416, 422
(Henry R. Black & William Elliott eds., 2013). Today, many have clinical outcome
claims in their labeling.
267. The review documents for older drugs in the dataset are not posted on
Drugs@FDA and would need to be obtained through the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”).
268. E.g., Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Accelerated & Restricted Approvals Under Subpart H (Drugs) and Subpart E (Biologics),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/ucm121597.htm (last updated
June 30, 2017).
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Table 1. Average Clinical Program Length in Years:
New Active Ingredient Drugs Approved After January 11, 1993
Accelerated Approval
Traditional Approval
(n=34)
(n=376)
Validated surrogate endNovel surrogate endEndpoints
points and clinical endpoints
points
Mean
5.61
6.28
Median
5.08
5.42
St. Dev.
2.41
3.43
Range
2.74 to 12.07
1.04 to 26.22
Second, drugs in the dataset approved from 2010 through 2014 on the
basis of either type of surrogate endpoint can be compared with drugs approved
during the same window on the basis of clinical endpoints.269 Table 2 reports
the results. Of the eighty drugs in the dataset approved in this time period, one
was tested overseas, leaving seventy-nine for analysis. The fifty-three drugs
approved on the basis of clinical endpoints averaged 7.79 years in clinical trials
(median 6.66, standard deviation 4.51). The twenty-six drugs approved on the
basis of surrogate endpoints averaged 6.82 years in clinical trials (median 5.84,
standard deviation 2.59). The twenty-one approved on the basis of validated
surrogate endpoints averaged 6.79 years (median 5.74, standard deviation
2.77), while the five approved on the basis of novel surrogate endpoints averaged 6.93 years (median 6.21, standard deviation 1.62). Drugs in the dataset
approved between 2010 and 2014 on the basis of validated surrogate endpoints
spent an average of one full year less in clinical trials than drugs approved on
the basis of clinical endpoints in the same time period.
Table 2. Average Clinical Program Length in Years:
New Active Ingredient Drugs Approved in 2010 Through 2014

Mean
Median
St. Dev.
Range

Clinical Endpoints
(n=53)

All Surrogate
Endpoints
(n=26)

7.79
6.66
4.51
2.39 to 26.22

6.82
5.84
2.59
3.35 to 15.63

Surrogate Endpoints
Validated
(n=21)
6.79
5.74
2.77
3.35 to 15.63

Novel
(n=5)
6.93
6.21
1.62
5.22 to 9.35

Together these tables indicate that programs using surrogate endpoints
are generally shorter than programs using clinical endpoints and that the difference is most pronounced for validated surrogate endpoints. The fact that
269. FDA has published a list of surrogate endpoint approvals during this time period. NOVEL DRUGS, supra note 163, at 2–7.
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surrogate endpoints – validated or novel – are associated with shorter programs
and less variability is generally consistent with the notion that surrogate endpoints can make an ordinary premarket paradigm possible for drugs that would
otherwise require an unusually long clinical testing period or an unusually large
sample size.270 (It is not clear, however, why clinical programs using novel
surrogate endpoints would take longer on average than clinical programs using
validated surrogate endpoints.) It is, of course, impossible to know what sort
of premarket program these particular drugs would have faced, had the surrogate markers not been available. But these tables suggest that when available,
surrogate endpoints may be able to mitigate the innovation paradox, ensuring
that companies will not be deterred by a long premarket program and correspondingly shortened period for post-approval exclusive marketing. As Part
IV.A. explained, however, surrogate endpoints are not a panacea for the paradox. First, whether they are available depends on factors beyond a firm’s control, including the drug’s class and mechanism of action, the disease type and
stage, the nature of the disease process itself, and any drug off-target effect.271
Second, FDA has been very cautious about permitting novel surrogate endpoints. And third, novel surrogate endpoints result in a narrow scope of approval and labeling; the product is different.

E. Other Factors Influencing Length
The dataset was also explored for possible trends with respect to therapeutic category, anticipated length of treatment, and pharmacologic class of the
active ingredient.

1. Therapeutic Category
The 570 drugs in the dataset (minus the five tested overseas) were sorted
by therapeutic category.272 Therapeutic categorization of drugs focuses on the
disease or condition that the drug treats and tends to focus on its primary organ
or outward signs and symptoms (“cardiovascular” versus “dermatological”).
270. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
271. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
272. The methodology was crude. Some drugs in the dataset were withdrawn from

the market years ago, and several were never launched in the United States. As a result,
no commonly used database provides a therapeutic category for every drug in the dataset. An orthogonal approach was adopted. For each drug, four sources were consulted: the U.S. Pharmacopoeia (“USP”) Medicare Model Guidelines for CMS Version
6.0, the recently released draft of version 7.0 of the same guidelines, the CDC LongTerm Care Drug Database System, and the NIH National Library of Medicine Drug
Portal. (Another possibility would have been the VA National Formulary, but it too
lacks information for some of the drugs.) Based on the information from these four
sources, each drug was placed into categories corresponding roughly to the USP categories. Twelve drugs were not categorized by any of the four sources and were left
uncategorized.
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Categories with fewer than five entries were dropped, which left 532 drugs in
the database.
Figure 5 illustrates the length of clinical testing periods sorted by therapeutic category. At the high end, as the analysis in Part IV suggested might be
the case, are the thirteen central nervous system agents, with an average clinical
testing period of 9.30 years, followed by two categories of psychiatric drugs –
antipsychotics (averaging 8.63 years) and antidepressants (8.49 years) – and
two categories that arguably should be part of the central nervous system category – anticonvulsants (8.13 years) and anti-Parkinson’s agents (7.48 years).
At the low end are six antimigraine agents, all serotonin receptor agonists, with
an average clinical testing period of 2.99 years and a maximum clinical testing
period of 4.75 years. Also at the low end are ophthalmic agents (averaging
4.38 years), sleep disorder drugs (4.47 years), antibacterials (4.59 years), antiviral drugs (4.68 years), and drugs for use in imaging tests (5.05 years).

Therapeutic Category (n)

Figure 5.
Average Clinical Testing Period by
Therapeutic Category
antimigraine agents (6)
ophthalmic (26)
sleep disorder (5)
antibacterials (51)
antivirals (27)
imaging agents (28)
antifungals (14)
genitourinary (12)
dermatological (13)
anesthetics (8)
metabolic bone disease (7)
respiratory/pulmonary (32)
blood glucose regulators (20)
antidementia agents (5)
cardiovascular drugs (65)
hormonal (31)
analgesics & anti-inflammatories (13)
antineoplastics (58)
antiemetics (7)
blood products (17)
gastrointestinal (19)
immunological (10)
antiparkinson's agents (7)
anticonvulsants (13)
antidepressants (16)
antipsychotics (9)
central nervous system (13)
0.00

2.99
4.38
4.47
4.59
4.68
5.05
5.13
5.29
5.38
5.57
5.58
5.73
6.06
6.08
6.12
6.33
6.38
6.39
6.58
6.70
6.72
6.77
7.48
8.13
8.49
8.63
9.30
2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

Length of Clinical Testing Period in Years
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Table 3 provides summary statistics for average clinical testing period by
therapeutic category. Whether one sorts by average or median, the ten categories with the longest clinical programs include the following nine: antipsychotics, central nervous system agents, antidepressants, anticonvulsants, anti-Parkinson’s agents, immunological agents, blood products, antiemetics, and
antineoplastic agents.
Table 3. Average Clinical Testing Period in Years
by Therapeutic Category
Average

Median

Min.

Max.

St.
Dev.

antimigraine agents (6)

2.99

2.94

1.42

4.75

1.05

ophthalmic (26)

4.38

4.20

1.04

9.54

1.99

sleep disorder (5)

4.47

3.55

3.42

6.67

1.30

antibacterials (51)

4.59

4.39

1.35

17.25

2.89

antivirals (27)

4.68

4.84

1.84

8.03

1.47

imaging agents (28)

5.05

3.42

0.54

17.72

4.18

antifungals (14)

5.13

5.17

1.75

9.27

1.82

genitourinary (12)

5.29

4.55

2.47

9.26

2.19

dermatological (13)

5.38

5.42

1.18

8.92

2.20

anesthetics (8)

5.57

5.30

2.11

9.67

2.55

metabolic bone disease (7)
respiratory/pulmonary
(32)
blood glucose regulators
(20)

5.58

6.28

1.71

9.90

2.68

5.73

4.84

1.54

11.61

2.63

6.06

5.40

2.45

12.45

2.64

antidementia agents (5)

6.08

5.21

2.98

12.87

3.63

cardiovascular drugs (65)

6.12

5.11

1.88

15.63

3.33

hormonal (31)
analgesics & anti-inflammatories (13)

6.33

5.29

1.34

14.32

3.44

6.38

5.69

2.95

11.06

2.42

antineoplastics (58)

6.39

5.95

1.93

13.31

2.69

antiemetics (7)

6.58

6.39

3.07

10.44

2.69

blood products (17)

6.70

6.71

1.97

13.07

2.53

gastrointestinal (19)

6.72

5.52

1.33

20.25

4.28

immunological (10)

6.77

6.49

2.83

12.61

2.92

anti-Parkinson’s agents (7)

7.48

7.27

5.52

9.68

1.58

anticonvulsants (13)

8.13

8.13

4.52

15.07

3.23

Category (n)
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Table 3. Average Clinical Testing Period in Years
by Therapeutic Category
Average

Median

Min.

Max.

St.
Dev.

antidepressants (16)

8.49

7.61

1.74

16.13

3.81

antipsychotics (9)
central nervous system
(13)

8.63

8.32

2.80

16.34

4.65

9.30

7.13

1.48

26.22

6.44

Category (n)

Table 3 suggests there is considerable variability within many of the therapeutic categories. To begin with, in all but five categories (antivirals, antifungals, dermatological, metabolic bone disease, and blood products) the median
clinical testing period is below the mean, indicating that in almost every category a few drugs with longer clinical testing periods skew the average. Moreover, drugs in nine categories have standard deviations exceeding three years:
central nervous system drugs (6.44 years), antipsychotics (4.65), gastrointestinal drugs (4.28), imaging agents (4.18), antidepressants (3.81), antidementia
drugs (3.63), hormonal drugs (3.44), cardiovascular drugs (3.33), and anticonvulsants (3.23). The least variable categories are the antimigraine drugs (1.05
years), sleep disorder drugs (1.30), antivirals (1.47), and anti-Parkinson’s
agents (1.58).
The apparent variability may be because therapeutic category is a poor
proxy for the factors that actually determine the length of phase 3 trials. Categorizing research and development experiences based on the organ system,
signs, and symptoms risks missing the scientific and regulatory considerations
that have the most influence on the length of the premarket period. Part IV of
this Article suggests these include the molecule itself and perhaps its mechanism of action and not only the disease but the disease stage and, most importantly, the outcome and use that the firm proposes to test and place in labeling.

2. Other Factors Relevant to Length of Premarket Period
a. Expected Length of Treatment
Many therapeutic categories combine drugs that are intended for immediate use with drugs that are intended for intermediate or even long-term use.
For instance, the category of immunological agents includes Firazyr (icatibant
acetate), approved for treatment of acute attacks of hereditary angioedema, as
well as Torisel (temsirolimus), approved for treatment of advanced renal cell
carcinoma, and Xeljanz (tofacitinib citrate), approved for treatment of rheumatoid arthritis. The 570 drugs in this dataset (minus the five tested overseas)
were therefore categorized by the expected length of treatment for the use approved by FDA at the end of the regulatory review period. The categories were
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Length of Testing Period in Years

acute use (less than one month), intermediate use (between one month and two
years), and chronic use (greater than two years).273
Figure 6 shows that drugs intended for chronic use take an average of 6.54
years in clinical trials (twenty-six percent more time than drugs for acute use),
while drugs intended for intermediate use take an average of 5.82 years, and
drugs intended for acute use take an average of 5.20 years. The median clinical
testing period follows the same pattern. But the standard deviations remain
high: 3.42 years for chronic-use drugs, 2.74 years for intermediate-use drugs,
and 3.15 years for acute-use drugs.

Figure 6. Mean and Median Clinical
Testing Period
by Expected Length of Treatment with
Drug
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00

4.49

5.20

acute (198)

5.26

5.82

intermediate (85)

6.54
5.61

chronic (282)

Expected Length of Treatment with Drug (n)

Median

Mean

273. These category definitions were adopted from a study that examined the duration of the pivotal efficacy trials supporting approval of new molecular entity drugs and
new biological products between 2005 and 2012. Nicholas Downing et al., Clinical
Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel Therapeutic Agents, 2005–2012,
311 JAMA 368, 369 (2014). Categorization was based primarily on the first approved
package insert, including the Indication statement and the Dosage and Administration
instructions. The first approved package insert was obtained from Drugs@FDA. If not
available from Drugs@FDA, the package insert was retrieved from the patent term restoration application or, failing that, the earliest edition of the PHYSICIAN’S DESK
REFERENCE in which it appeared. Where none of these sources provided the first package insert, characterization of the first approved indication statement was taken from
the text of the patent term restoration application, the FDA approval letter, or reporting
in the PINK SHEET when the drug was first approved. Two individuals performed the
categorization: the author, based on her expertise in pharmaceutical regulatory law, and
an associate professor of family and community medicine at the University of Missouri,
based on his training and expertise in the practice of medicine. Each was blinded to
the other’s work, and disagreements were resolved through discussion.
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Without regard to therapeutic category, drugs tested, approved, and labeled for longer-term use consistently require longer clinical development programs. This is not because trials mimic real world use. Rather, the overall
length of a clinical program reflects the speed and ease of progression from
phase 1 through phase 2 to phase 3 and the duration of the phase 3 trials. The
latter in turn reflects the trial size, the disease and disease stage, the hypothesized outcome, the trial endpoints, as well as perhaps the drug’s mechanism of
action, the nature of alternative treatments on the market, and various other
considerations. The conditions targeted by the 282 drugs for chronic use in the
dataset include common disorders of aging (such as osteoarthritis and hypertension) as well as serious psychiatric conditions (depression, anxiety, and
schizophrenia) and life-threatening but ultimately chronic viral infections (HIV
and hepatitis). They also include treatments for Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis, and fibromyalgia, as well as treatments for
some slowly progressing cancers, such as prostate cancer. Again, these drugs
are consistently associated with longer overall clinical testing periods.
b. Established Pharmacologic Class
In addition to grouping together drugs that are for acute use and drugs that
are for chronic use, therapeutic categories group together drugs for diseases
that have distinct molecular causes and divide drugs for diseases with common
molecular cause.274 They may group together some drugs with different mechanisms of action and separate some drugs with the same basic mechanism of
action.275 Although there does not appear to be a publicly available database
that categorizes all of the drugs in this dataset by mechanism of action or the
molecular cause of the disease in question, FDA captures some of the same
considerations when it assigns an “established pharmacologic class” to approved drugs. A “pharmacological class” is defined by reference to three attributes of the active moieties that fall within it: mechanism of action, physiological effect, and chemical structure.276 FDA designates a pharmacological
class as the “established pharmacologic class” for an approved indication of a
specific active moiety if the class is both scientifically valid and clinically
meaningful with respect to that moiety and indication.277
274. PAVING THE WAY, supra note 225, at 17.
275. E.g., Littman, supra note 203, at 22.
276. OFFICE OF NEW DRUGS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DETERMINING THE

ESTABLISHED PHARMACOLOGIC CLASS FOR USE IN THE HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING
INFORMATION 1 (July 18, 2013), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/UCM361380.pdf.
277. Id. at 2. The class is scientifically valid if evidence shows that it is known (not
merely assumed), relevant, and specific to the indication. It is clinically meaningful if
understanding the pharmacological effect enhances the ability of healthcare professionals to understand the physiologic basis of the indication or their ability to anticipate
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The 570 drugs in the dataset (minus the five tested overseas) were sorted
by established pharmacologic class, and the seventy-five drugs that lacked an
assigned class were dropped.278 FDA placed twenty-three of the remaining 490
drugs into more than one class; the nine that contained more than one active
ingredient were dropped, and the remaining fourteen were considered in each
category assigned. Table 4 provides the summary statistics for any classes
containing more than four drugs.
Table 4. Length of Testing Period by Established Pharmacologic
Class
St.
Established Pharmacologic Class (n)
Mean
Median
Dev.
radioactive diagnostic agents and con2.95
2.97
1.04
trast agents (11)
serotonin-1b and serotonin-1d receptor
2.99
2.94
1.05
agonist (6)
histamine-1 (H1) and histamine-2 (H2)
3.05
2.88
1.49
receptor antagonist (8)
quinolone antimicrobial (7)
3.68
3.57
1.23
cephalosporin antibacterial (13)
3.96
3.30
1.66
corticosteroid (7)
4.17
3.97
2.14
HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor (6)
cholinesterase inhibitor (4)
topoisomerase inhibitor (6)

4.21
4.38
4.59

3.07
4.10
5.17

2.12
1.45
1.91

cholinergic muscarinic antagonist (4)

4.62

3.79

2.26

proton pump inhibitor (7)
retinoid (4)
beta-2 adrenergic agonist (4)
dihydropyridine calcium channel
blocker (6)

4.74
4.79
5.00

4.45
4.94
5.01

2.04
0.65
2.04

5.04

4.06

2.79

undesirable effects that may be associated with the active moiety or pharmacologic
class.
278. FDA regulations state that if a product belongs to an established pharmacologic class, the approved labeling must identify the class. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a)(6)
(2017) (requiring a statement under Indications and Usage that “(Drug) is a (name of
class) indicated for (indication(s))”). FDA has also issued a forty-five-page guidance
document listing active moieties by their established pharmacological class. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA ESTABLISHED
PHARMACOLOGIC CLASS (EPC) TEXT PHASE,
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/LawsActsandRules/UCM428333.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) (listing active moieties by established pharmacological class).
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Table 4. Length of Testing Period by Established Pharmacologic
Class
St.
Established Pharmacologic Class (n)
Mean
Median
Dev.
human immunodeficiency virus 1 nonnucleoside analog reverse transcriptase
inhibitor (5)
5.05
4.96
0.62
prostaglandin analog (5)
5.16
4.16
2.25
estrogen and progestin (4)
5.22
3.48
4.01
azole antifungal (9)
angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor (7)
bisphosphonate (5)
gonadotropin releasing hormone receptor agonist (4)
alpha-adrenergic blocker (7)
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory (10)
serotonin-3 receptor antagonist (5)

5.22

5.20

1.65

5.34
5.49

4.80
6.28

1.33
1.83

5.78
5.92

6.23
5.07

1.71
2.37

5.99
6.10

5.31
4.74

2.50
2.80

kinase inhibitor (15)
anti-coagulant (4)

6.54

6.20

2.47

6.73
6.84
6.98

7.41
6.91
6.49

2.97
2.52
2.51

7.39
8.33
8.55
8.88
9.16

6.66
7.44
8.05
9.64
7.76

3.48
3.93
4.42
2.35
5.39

2.95

2.97

1.04

2.99
8.55
8.88
9.16

2.94
8.05
9.64
7.76

1.05
4.42
2.35
5.39

nucleoside metabolic inhibitor (5)
anti-epileptic agent (10)
beta-adrenergic blocker (9)
serotonin reuptake inhibitor (13)
atypical antipsychotic (10)
anti-arrhythmic (7)
norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor (6)
radioactive diagnostic agents and contrast agents (11)
serotonin-1b and serotonin-1d receptor
agonist (6)
atypical antipsychotic (10)
anti-arrhythmic (7)
norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor (6)

The consistently smaller standard deviations in this chart (as compared to
the standard deviations when sorting drugs by therapeutic categorization or duration of treatment) invites the hypothesis that the pharmacologic class of a
new drug – which combines its mechanism of action, physiological effect,
chemical structure – directly influences the length of the clinical testing period.
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This is consistent with the discussion in Part IV, which suggested that the
length of any particular premarket research and development process is likely
to depend on factors like the disease and its biological process, the chemical
structure of the drug and its mechanism of action, and the possible outcomes
(physiological effects) to be tested.
This interpretation is important because it suggests the length of any particular program will depend on factors generally outside the sponsor’s control.
This is key to understanding the problem with the innovation paradox in the
field of medicine. If longer premarket programs are associated with shorter
post-market exclusivity, and if sponsors have limited control over the time that
will be needed to bring a particular product (active ingredient, product features,
disease, outcome) to market, the paradox may lead rational companies to select
different products – with shorter timelines – in the first instance. Companies
may avoid important areas of medical need. Many of the drugs in the dataset
were not included in this analysis of established pharmacologic class, however,
and more data points would be helpful to explore this correlation.

F. Scope of These Findings
The goal of this Article is to describe the premarket research and development program for new medicines in order to better understand the innovation
paradox. It focuses on approved new drugs with new active ingredients because FDA has published the regulatory milestones for most of those drugs.
The agency has not, however, calculated a regulatory review period for all new
medicines that might be of interest, and the dataset includes some drugs that
may skew the results.
First, the analysis does not reflect many new active ingredient drugs that
started clinical trials in the mid to late 2000s. The dataset includes data for 221
drugs that started trials in the 1990s but data for only 100 drugs that started
trials in the 2000s. When this Article was being written, there were more than
seventy pending patent term restoration requests for approved new drugs for
which FDA had not yet calculated a regulatory review period. All of these
drugs were approved in 2012 or later, and presumably all were in clinical trials
in the mid to late 2000s. As a result, the analysis does not fully reflect changes
in the premarket research and development paradigm – including statutory and
regulatory changes, evolution in clinical trial and statistical methodologies, advances in computer-assisted data analysis, scientific discoveries and opportunities, and changes in the regulatory culture – in the 2000s.
Second, the analysis does not capture new active ingredient drugs for
which FDA did not calculate a regulatory review period. This includes any for
which a request was not timely filed at PTO, any requests abandoned or withdrawn before FDA calculated the regulatory review period, and any for which
the NDA holders neglected to seek restoration to which they were entitled. The
original spreadsheet from PTO indicates that the first two groups are small (in
the single digits). The third group is surprisingly large. A review of historical
editions of the Orange Book identified more than 100 drugs approved in the
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time period covered by this dataset that were awarded new chemical entity exclusivity but were not in the patent term restoration dataset. Most appear to
have listed patents, and it is unclear why the NDA holders did not request patent term restoration. One possibility is mistake. Another possibility is that
these companies were already slated to enjoy fourteen or more years of effective patent life on any patents they might have sought to restore (listed or
not).279 Where the second explanation is true, it would be important to learn
more. Some could be instances where a particularly long research and development period eliminated all effective patent life on the active ingredient patent, leaving only later-expiring patents on formulation and the like. In these
cases, fourteen years of effective patent life might not translate to fourteen
years of effective market exclusivity. In the alternative, some could be instances where a swift premarket program led to approval with fourteen years
remaining on the active ingredient patent. In such a case, the firm might well
have enjoyed fourteen years of effective market exclusivity.
Third, the dataset does not include biological medicines, which are licensed under a different statute, the Public Health Service Act.280 Neither the
Orange Book nor the newly established Purple Book for biologics lists patents
claiming these products, and there was therefore no proxy for the beginning of
the preclinical period for purposes of the analysis in Part V.B. FDA has published the regulatory review period for these products, however, and it would
have been possible to conduct the analyses in Parts V.C. through V.E.
Although this analysis was not performed, there is good reason to think
the results would have been similar. Although biologics are licensed under a
different statute, as a scientific and regulatory matter the premarket schemes
are mostly harmonized.281 Therapeutic biologics have been regulated by the
279. One example is Actonel (risedronate sodium), approved in March 1998 with
five years of NCE exclusivity. Letter from James Bilstad, Dir., Office of Drug Evaluation II, to Hina Wu, Senior Scientist (Mar. 27, 1998) (on file with FDA). The NDA
holder listed three patents, and the earliest to expire (U.S. Patent No. 5,583,122) was
slated to expire in December 2013 – more than fourteen years after NDA approval.
There was no point seeking patent term restoration.
280. At the time this Article was drafted, FDA’s website listed 143 therapeutic biological products with approved biologics license applications. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., List of Licensed Biological Products with
(1) Reference Product Exclusivity and (2) Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations to Date, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/Biosimilars/UCM560162.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
281. See Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey Elikan & Erika Lietzan, An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 Food
& Drug. L.J. 671, 687 (2010); see Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115, § 123(f), 111 Stat. 2296, 2324 (directing FDA to “take
measures to minimize differences in the review and approval of products required to
have approved biologics license applications under section 351 of the [PHSA] and
products required to have approved new drug applications under section 505(b)(1) of
the [FDCA]”).
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unit at FDA responsible for drugs – not the unit responsible for other biologics
like vaccines – since 2003.282 The same clinical trial regulations apply to both
new drugs and therapeutic biologics, and FDA’s guidance documents on premarket research and development – such as the exploratory IND guidance, the
statistical methodology guidance, the cancer endpoints guidance, and the early
Alzheimer’s guidance – apply equally to both. FDA generally does not differentiate, and the statutory and regulatory paradigm does not provide any reason
to think that the findings in this Article would not also apply to therapeutic
biological medicines.
Fourth, the dataset includes forty-five new drugs that did not receive new
chemical entity exclusivity. FDA denies NCE status when a drug contains the
same active moiety as a previously approved drug.283 The standard for patent
term restoration is different and more forgiving.284 The inclusion of non-NCE
drugs may have skewed the results of the analysis because the premarket programs for these drugs may have been reduced if the same firm had developed
the earlier drug that received exclusivity. If the firm owned the application for
the prior drug (or was willing to pay for the right to reference it), relevant data
from the first application could be used. In this situation, the firm might have
performed only a phase 2 dose-ranging study and the phase 3 pivotal trials.
Excluding the five drugs studied overseas and the thirty-three drugs approved
under the antibiotic provisions prior to 1997 (because they were not eligible
for NCE status), the average clinical period for the non-NCE drugs in the dataset is 4.59 years, noticeably shorter than the average for the NCE drugs,
which is 6.18 years. It is unclear whether approval of non-NCE drugs with
shorter premarket timelines affects some therapeutic categories or established
pharmacologic classes in the dataset more than others. The correlation between
pharmacologic class and length of clinical program might be more clear if one
excluded the new drugs that were not NCEs and if it were possible to obtain
the regulatory review period information for all NCEs.
Finally, the dataset does not include new drugs that are not new active
ingredients. This includes new drugs for which patent term restoration requests
were submitted and rejected, as well as new drugs for which patent term restoration requests were never submitted. Companies could face an innovation
paradox when engaging in incremental innovation with old, established molecules, but the nature of the innovation is different, and a different analysis –
beyond the scope of this Article – would need to be performed.

282. Drug and Biological Product Consolidation, 68 Fed. Reg. 38,067 (June 26,

2003).
283. See discussion supra Part III.A.
284. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The problem explored in this Article is the paradoxical relationship between drug innovation and its reward. The reward shrinks (or, at best, stays
flat) when premarket innovation takes longer. On the whole this should lead
to post-invention efficiency, minimizing the impact of any endogenous factors
contributing to the premarket program length.285 It also means that companies
are unlikely to make choices specifically to delay market entry. With the clock
ticking on post-approval market exclusivity, there is no benefit to doing so.286
The historical and empirical work in this Article leads to three important
insights about the paradoxical relationship between drug innovation and its reward.
First, the length of any particular drug’s premarket research and development program may depend heavily on factors like the disease and its therapeutic category, our current understanding of the causal pathways of the disease,
the proposed therapeutic outcome, the chemical structure of the active ingredient, its mechanism of action, its physiological effect, and FDA’s innate conservatism. These exogenous factors are beyond the sponsor’s control in the
sense that any seasoned firm with qualified personnel picking one premarket
program instead of another would face the same issues.287
Second, certain drugs are simply going to take longer to develop. These
will include some drugs for some early stage cancers that have a longer time to
progression and mortality, for instance, as well as drugs for use in the earliest

285. For instance, Bristol-Myers Squibb historically required eight months “to produce and activate a new study protocol” but has made “efforts to improve the review
cycle” and reduce the internal process to five months. REBECCA A. ENGLISH ET AL.,
TRANSFORMING CLINICAL RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 34 (2010).
286. According to Professor Roin, the product-development management literature
reveals an “accepted wisdom” that because time to market “is . . . the most important
factor affecting the internal rate of return” on investment, “most firms work hard to get
their inventions onto the market as quickly as possible.” Benjamin N. Roin, The Case
for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 713
(2014). He found five explanations in the literature, one of which seems particularly
salient here: that “delays diminish the innovator’s window of opportunity to earn a
profit from its invention.” Id. at 714.
287. Other exogenous factors may contribute to the length of a particular premarket
testing program, including raw materials that are difficult to find, the fact that studies
must be performed where experts are available to serve as investigators rather than
where patients may be located, and bureaucratic delays at academic institutions providing clinical trial workforces. ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 285, at 31, 35–36 (“U.S. academic institutions typically take longer to navigate the approval process (i.e., from
budget/contract to IRB approval) compared to private or academic institutions
abroad.”) (citing Dr. Woodcock for proposition that “[w]hen patient recruitment is impeded, the trial is delayed, sometimes by years, until the number of patients required
by the study protocol can be enrolled”).
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stages of neurodegenerative diseases if the therapeutic goal is delay or prevention of the ultimate outcome. They will include drugs for long-term use for
conditions (such as diabetes mellitus) that significantly precede clinical events
of interest (such as heart disease, stroke, and kidney damage). They will include drugs intended for less well understood body systems, like the central
nervous system, where even novel surrogate markers may be years off.
Third, the choices faced by a company in the new drug paradigm are generally not choices among more and less efficient routes to the same end result.
A new drug in the federal drug scheme is a particular combination of active
ingredient, product features, and the labeling (disease and outcome). The research performed by a drug’s sponsor thus defines the product approved by
FDA at the end of the day. This means the sponsor’s choices during the research and development period are tantamount to choices about the product to
be pursued. The Paraplatin example illustrates why it may generally be more
rational to select a short runway with a limited approval than a long runway
with a broader approval. This decision may be due to the time value of money,
but the innovation paradox suggests that it may also result from the price paid
in lost effective patent life when clinical programs run longer.
As a matter of public policy we may prefer that companies facing this
choice select the product with the shorter runway. But in some cases a company will not have that option. If a company must choose between a long runway and a different product altogether, the innovation paradox may mean
whole areas of medicine remain underdeveloped. The implication for social
welfare is that we may have a profound interest in breaking the paradox – in
ensuring that longer research programs no longer lead to shorter rewards.
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